The Counter-Terrorism Blog has a useful roundup of Thailand's continuing failure to defeat the Muslim insurgency in the South. Bangkok's mistakes include the deployment of troops with little ground knowledge of their respective sectors, heavy-handed usage of mass arrests, and the government's continuing refusal to admit that the insurgents have religious and political grievances. Instead, the Thai government labels the insurgents as bandits, drug-dealers, and criminals, in spite of the ample evidence to the contrary.
One of the worst problems with the Thai government response is its dependence on poorly trained civilian militias. As the International Crisis Group notes, These militias are hardly effective at combating the insurgents--but are very good at committing war crimes against the civilian population. Reliance on these local forces may secure tactical victories but ensures strategic defeat. The civilian population will be hardly willing to lend a hand if militia "rangers" continue severing their limbs.
Thailand's paramilitary problem once again demonstrates that local militias aren't a panacea for governments trying to fight irregular enemies such as terrorists, guerrillas, and international criminals. If we are in fact, heading towards a future of government-backed "open source" counter-terrorism, the prognosis for the success of our political objectives isn't good.