REPORT: RUSSIA-GEORGIA

I posted an earlier analysis on this subject, but decided it was too soon to look at the situation. Now that things have stabilized somewhat, this much is clear:

• Georgia made a major miscalculation in assuming that it could take South Ossetia and then present it to Putin as a fait accompli. Even if Georgia had succeeded in doing so Putin still would have attacked anyway and devastated the country. While it may be, as Jamestown Foundation argues, that this was a trap set by Russia, Georgia walked into it through their own revanchism and heedless adventurism. Worse, this adventurism was coupled with a massively delusional expectation that the "international community" would come to their rescue if it failed. 
• The Russian Army is not the desiccated, pathetic mob of soccer hooligans of Yeltsin's era. There is still the brute force, clumsiness, and "fire-and-forget" school of urban warfare, but Russia's armed forces moved with a vigor and purpose that suggests excellent morale, organization, and discipline. 
• Massive cyber-operations (the RBN at work),  information operations (the images of South Ossetia ablaze) and spoiling attacks carried out by Ossetian guerrilla forces (or Russian agents operating as agent provocateurs) were integrated skillfully into the conventional campaign. While Patrick Lang apparently believes that this war is a stick in the eye for asymmetric warfare theorists, the real theoretical winner of this conflict is Frank Hoffman--Russia vs. Georgia is a good example of his "Hybrid War" theorem. Also see Kings of War for an objective (and correct) take on what the conflict means in the larger context. 
• Russia will continue to attack, devastating Georgia's military and economic infrastructure and possibly, as Zenpundit argues, topple Saakashvili and replace him with a pliable puppet. Even if they can't, it is hard to imagine Georgia re-asserting control of its territories, enhancing its military/economic profile, or joining NATO anytime soon. No matter the outcome, Georgia's power and influence will be heavily diminished. 
• The United States and Europe look weak for allowing this to occur and it will be taken by outside observers as a sign of American decline. This may be erroneous (not intervening to stop USSR from crushing Hungary and the Czechs didn't mean that we were losing the Cold War), but it is likely that it will be perceived as such by important third parties. China-watchers should pay attention to how Beijing perceives this attack. 
• Putin is now the man of the hour. However, the question remains: will he be the new Russia's Bismarck--or its Louis XIV? 

Comments

[pacer521]

great report.

[Kotare]

I think your analysis is spot on, Adam, although it's interesting to see Russia calling a halt to its offensive and exercising some restraint. A key question for me is whether irregular and covert operations will continue, e.g., with the aim of consolidating Russia's hold in South Ossetia, or driving the Gerogians out of Abkhazia once and for all, or further weakening Saakashvili.