Rethinking Security

Police-Military Interaction in Mexico

My frequent writing partner John P. Sullivan has a great new piece in the Spanish edition of Air Space and Power Journal (link goes to English translation) on police-military interaction in Mexico's drug war.

Key graph:

"Policing post-conflict situations is notoriously difficult for military forces. The military establishes the conditions for order, them generally seeks to transition social control to civil police or transitional gendarmerie forces.50 The situation is even more complex in a state of on-going high intensity criminal violence such as that found in a “criminal insurgency” or drug war. Police and the military are equally challenged by brigands and gangsters who operate with near impunity. This is compounded by the challenge of operating within a fearful community, compromised by corrupt officials and a plethora of security leaks. To effectively operate in this environment, both the police and military services need to develop and employ new skills at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels."

Vigilante Violence Spreads in Mexico

(via Susanne Ure) Unfortunately very predictable:

"As kidnappings, muggings and car jackings spiral out of control, and the authorities appear increasingly impotent, shadowy groups have been advocating justice by the sword. In other recent cases, alleged kidnappers and car thieves have been abducted and murdered and had their corpses dumped in public places along with threatening notes. There are also rising cases of mobs lynching alleged thieves and leaving them beaten, naked and tied up."

Echoes of the Past

The first book on counterinsurgency that I read was David Galula's Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, acknowledged as the primary inspiration behind the celebrated Army/Marine Corps counterinsurgency manual. There have been many criticisms of the "neoclassical" counterinsurgency school, and I think that Frank Hoffman's Parameters article on the subject was most persuasive in delineating some of the theory's limitations.

I have returned to the "classical" era by reading Roger Trinquier's Modern Warfare. Trinquier, like Galula, was a French officer of the late imperial era who cut his small wars teeth in Algeria and Vietnam. I have not gotten far in Trinquier's book, but much of his rhetoric could have been written by defense writers today. Depending on where you sit in the COIN debate that could be either a good or bad thing.

This paragraph, for example, sounds eerily prescient:

"Thanks to a specially adapted organization and to appropriate methods of warfare, they have been successful in imposing themselves upon entire populations and in using them, despite their own desires in the matter, against us. Our enemies are submitting us to a kind of hateful extortion, to which we shall have to accede in the end if we cannot destroy the warfare system that confronts us. We would be gravely remiss in our duty if we should permit ourselves to be thus deluded and to abandon the struggle before final victory. We would be sacrificing defenseless populations to unscrupulous enemies."

"Start Snitching"

Hakim Hazim, who's often written on GroupIntel about gang violence, has an interesting new piece at MSNBC's The Grio on crime and popular attitudes:

"There is a code and practice that has to be addressed in the black community. It's a code of silence that is deafening. It is a code that refuses to hear the blood of our brothers crying out. The "stop snitching" movement is a social construct enforced through various fears including fear of retribution and ostracism. But it's time to move beyond this dishonorable system, once put in place because of racist and hostile law enforcement agencies eager to round up any young black male that they could find."

The "stop snitching" movement is an interesting case for applying counterinsurgency theory to a domestic issue. In many parts of the inner city the police are seen as a kind of occupying army that only enters for raids (Iraq pre-surge?). Functional areas are controlled by gangs running sophisticated operations. "Stop snitching" manifests itself in three levels: a basic blood code enforced with violence by gangs in order to keep the population from offering the police support., a societal attitude (somewhat less significant), and an IO operation produced by those sympathetic to gangs (popular entertainers).
Hazim is right to point to its negative consequences and urge a rejection of the "stop snitching" ethos on a societal level. Yet one of the more basic elements of "stop snitching" is the lack of protection for those who "snitch" in even the smallest fashion. The most basic thing that must be done is to ensure that witnesses who see crimes feel like they can report them without fear of violent retaliation.

Southern Battlespace

New entry on Mexico and South America on RTJ.

Design and Strategy

I have a new comment on RTJ about problem-framing and Afghanistan.

Marten on the Tribal Myth

Kimberly Marten makes a great point about the current "tribe" meme circulating around defense policy circles:

"The U.S. and Afghan governments have announced a new policy to pay tribal militias to provide security in Afghanistan. This began as a measure to deter Taliban attacks during recent elections but is set to become permanent. Almost point for point, this plan repeats the terrible mistake that the British colonial army made in the Pashtun tribal areas in what would become Pakistan, in the late 19th century.The British disrupted local Pashtun power balances by injecting outside money into tribal politics. British intelligence officers created charts of which sub-tribes and leaders (or maliks) had the most influence, and paid them extra money. The favored maliks in turn used these funds for patronage, paying off their supporters. Canny Pashtun factions second-guessed the British, creating security problems that they then 'solved' to look more powerful. British payments to the new 'official maliks' became hereditary. This system violated the tribal code of equality among all Pashtun men, but the official maliks accepted it with enthusiasm."

What usually happens is that these social relationships become embedded in the basic fabric of new states. The usage of tribal networks is not the harnessing of existing resources or restoring a tribal structure disrupted by war. What is really going on is the creation of new relationships and social networks, and we usually lack the granular knowledge necessary to carry out such activities effectively on the strategic level.

However, if the goal, as John Robb noted, is more tactical in focus (disrupt the enemy and clear the way for a drawdown) then this may make temporary sense, especially when combined with more aggressive enemy-centric operations like Gian P. Gentile suggests.

Offshore Balancing and the Definition of Victory

Two new posts at RTJ on how to define victory and the limitations of offshore balancing strategies in Afghanistan.

It's a Trap!

Abu Muquwama's Marine Corps cousin asks a somewhat offbeat question:

"Why didn't the Rebel Alliance pursue a strategy of insurgency in their rebellion against the Galactic Empire? I would argue that they pursued a strategy of conventional war against the Empire and forwent every aspect of insurgent strategy and tactics. They finally came around a bit in the end by co-opting the Ewoks onto their side. Why hadn't they pursued that strategy on a larger scale? Instead, they simply staged two conventional assualts on the Empire's center of gravity: the Death Star.  Although both attempts were successful, I think they got lucky. I think they would have been better served had read their Mao and followed his maxims. Why didn't the Empire follow counterinsurgency doctrine? Destroying Alderan was probably the dumbest move ever, one that the Alliance could have exploited to their advantage with the proper IO campaign. "

The analysis here does not really deal at all with the political context established in the films and Star Wars expanded universe. Instead, there's merely a discussion of operations and tactics. Classical insurgency and and population-centric counterinsurgency are just automatically assumed to be the best uses of force that both parties can employ.

"Divine Justice" in Mexico

Sam Logan and John P. Sullivan have a new article in ISN on La Familia that chronicles the group's emergence and impact on the Mexican security situation:

"Mexican analysts believe that La Familia formed in the 1980s with the stated purpose of bringing order to Michoacan, emphasizing help and protection for the poor. In its initial incarnation, La Familia formed as a group of vigilantes, spurred to power to counter interloping kidnappers and drug dealers, who were their stated enemies. Since then, La Familia has capitalized on its reputation, building its myth, power and reach to transition into a criminal gang itself. While doing so, it has become a powerful regional polydrug organization with its fingers in methamphetamine, marijuana and cocaine trafficking; kidnapping for ransom; and pirated CDs and DVDs - not to mention co-opting politicians and seizing political control and influence."

La Familia is a good example of what happens to ideological groups in drug conflicts. La Familia, like the FARC, is essentially a giant gang now with little linkage to the views it once espoused. That is also why vigilante groups in Mexico are not a sign of the end of cartel terror. Al they signify is another player entering the stage.

Hakim Hazim has a useful post in GroupIntel looking at the impact of micro movements like La Familia with potentially macro impact. This is the reality of strategic compression. And he is right to classify La Familia as a radical grouping, comparing them to Hamas:

"La Familia’s propaganda extends into the realm of faith. One could argue that it is a religious movement as well. The cartel’s spiritual leader, Nazario “The Maddest One” Moreno, has solidified his status as the people’s preacher. He has produced a gospel of self-help for downtrodden supporters, justified violence for its active members, and evangelical zeal and slogans to maintain a sense of familiarity with the larger faith. La Famalia spreads its messages of hope, salvation and divine justice through various media outlets. In addition they have given gifts to the poor and employ a large number of people at ten times the national average (nearly $2000 a month). By providing things the state has not: services, money, religious identity and social mobility within the group, La Familia is winning big political points in the guise of religion. The pattern is not much different from that of Hamas, Hezbollah or many other terror networks that work to secure the favor of the people and have a religious ideology as a cover for their action. Radical networks are evolving and increasing their efforts to win the hearts and minds of the people. The cartels are operating without constraint as a law unto themselves."