Kimberly Marten makes a great point about the current "tribe" meme circulating around defense policy circles:
"The U.S. and Afghan governments have announced a new policy to pay tribal militias to provide security in Afghanistan. This began as a measure to deter Taliban attacks during recent elections but is set to become permanent. Almost point for point, this plan repeats the terrible mistake that the British colonial army made in the Pashtun tribal areas in what would become Pakistan, in the late 19th century.The British disrupted local Pashtun power balances by injecting outside money into tribal politics. British intelligence officers created charts of which sub-tribes and leaders (or maliks) had the most influence, and paid them extra money. The favored maliks in turn used these funds for patronage, paying off their supporters. Canny Pashtun factions second-guessed the British, creating security problems that they then 'solved' to look more powerful. British payments to the new 'official maliks' became hereditary. This system violated the tribal code of equality among all Pashtun men, but the official maliks accepted it with enthusiasm."
What usually happens is that these social relationships become embedded in the basic fabric of new states. The usage of tribal networks is not the harnessing of existing resources or restoring a tribal structure disrupted by war. What is really going on is the creation of new relationships and social networks, and we usually lack the granular knowledge necessary to carry out such activities effectively on the strategic level.
However, if the goal, as John Robb noted, is more tactical in focus (disrupt the enemy and clear the way for a drawdown) then this may make temporary sense, especially when combined with more aggressive enemy-centric operations like Gian P. Gentile suggests.
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