Rethinking Security

Inconvenient Truths

Robert J. Bunker and Hakim J. Hazim point out an inconvenient truth: self-radicalization is an important domestic facet of the terrorist threat, and ignorance of it in public debate.

For procedural issues, this point is important:

"Specifically, while non-state warfare can be waged by larger radical Islamic cells, i.e. those which have been successfully interdicted such as the 2002 Lackawanna, New York (Muktar al-Bakri et al); 2005 Lodi, California (Hayat family et al); 2007 Fort Dix, New Jersey (Duka family et al); and 2009 New York (Najibullah Zazi et al) groups, it must also ask whether cells composed of ones and twos are not now also part of this threat spectrum. If ignored and simply labeled as ‘other than war (or terrorist)’ incidents, we may find ourselves with a homeland security capability superbly suited to combat large (and more conventional) cells belonging to the radical Islamic network but not the smaller and to date more effective ones. Such roles and missions would thus be deemed outside of current counter-terrorism operations even though they too may become not necessarily the mission US governmental agencies and personnel desire but the one that they end up with."

Police-Military Interaction in Mexico

My frequent writing partner John P. Sullivan has a great new piece in the Spanish edition of Air Space and Power Journal (link goes to English translation) on police-military interaction in Mexico's drug war.

Key graph:

"Policing post-conflict situations is notoriously difficult for military forces. The military establishes the conditions for order, them generally seeks to transition social control to civil police or transitional gendarmerie forces.50 The situation is even more complex in a state of on-going high intensity criminal violence such as that found in a “criminal insurgency” or drug war. Police and the military are equally challenged by brigands and gangsters who operate with near impunity. This is compounded by the challenge of operating within a fearful community, compromised by corrupt officials and a plethora of security leaks. To effectively operate in this environment, both the police and military services need to develop and employ new skills at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels."

The Tactics of Urban Assault

The recent attacks on Pakistani cities and military bases, John P. Sullivan and I argue, falls into a larger pattern of urban attacks and paramilitary assaults that makes for increasingly more violent strikes against urban targets. The strategic significance of these attacks, however, is hard to assess. Check our article out at OpenDemocracy's new security page.

The Illusion of Safety

Kings of War 's Faceless Bureaucrat eloquently states what the United Nations should already know: good intentions does not dissuade terrorists:

"[The UN] is not an independent and neutral actor, performing a series of good deeds around the world. Rather, it is an important (albeit imperfect) component of a system that is “Governing the Periphery with Aid, Peace, and Justice”. And it is in this sense that is open to attack: those who are resisting the governance believe it to be legitimate to attack those who are party to it. "

Whether or not things like "such as respect for the rule of law, democracy, human rights, access to food for all" are Western or universal values is another discussion entirely, but many terrorist groups make hostility to many parts of globalized modernity a basic element of their ideology. To use the language of Thomas P.M. Barnett, one might argue that UN and NGOs perform the function of a SysAdmin, albeit a heavily demilitarized one.

Even outside the specific context of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, Qat-chewing child soldiers and their masters do not think too highly of blue helmets either. The UN will have to spend more on security, certainly more than the 1% figure that the Bureaucrat cites in his post.

Echoes of the Past

The first book on counterinsurgency that I read was David Galula's Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, acknowledged as the primary inspiration behind the celebrated Army/Marine Corps counterinsurgency manual. There have been many criticisms of the "neoclassical" counterinsurgency school, and I think that Frank Hoffman's Parameters article on the subject was most persuasive in delineating some of the theory's limitations.

I have returned to the "classical" era by reading Roger Trinquier's Modern Warfare. Trinquier, like Galula, was a French officer of the late imperial era who cut his small wars teeth in Algeria and Vietnam. I have not gotten far in Trinquier's book, but much of his rhetoric could have been written by defense writers today. Depending on where you sit in the COIN debate that could be either a good or bad thing.

This paragraph, for example, sounds eerily prescient:

"Thanks to a specially adapted organization and to appropriate methods of warfare, they have been successful in imposing themselves upon entire populations and in using them, despite their own desires in the matter, against us. Our enemies are submitting us to a kind of hateful extortion, to which we shall have to accede in the end if we cannot destroy the warfare system that confronts us. We would be gravely remiss in our duty if we should permit ourselves to be thus deluded and to abandon the struggle before final victory. We would be sacrificing defenseless populations to unscrupulous enemies."

Southern Battlespace

New entry on Mexico and South America on RTJ.

Countering Terrorists--What It Really Means

Short comment on RTJ on the relevance of the Somalia raid to counterterrorism policy.

Offshore Balancing and the Definition of Victory

Two new posts at RTJ on how to define victory and the limitations of offshore balancing strategies in Afghanistan.

Learning from Mumbai Part 2

Anyone with a subscription to Journal of Information Warfare should check out Chris Flaherty's essay "2D vs. 3D Tactical Supremacy in Urban Operations." Flaherty critiques and expands on the framework John P. Sullivan and I developed in "Postcard from Mumbai" and introduces his own highly original concept of urban defense.

"Divine Justice" in Mexico

Sam Logan and John P. Sullivan have a new article in ISN on La Familia that chronicles the group's emergence and impact on the Mexican security situation:

"Mexican analysts believe that La Familia formed in the 1980s with the stated purpose of bringing order to Michoacan, emphasizing help and protection for the poor. In its initial incarnation, La Familia formed as a group of vigilantes, spurred to power to counter interloping kidnappers and drug dealers, who were their stated enemies. Since then, La Familia has capitalized on its reputation, building its myth, power and reach to transition into a criminal gang itself. While doing so, it has become a powerful regional polydrug organization with its fingers in methamphetamine, marijuana and cocaine trafficking; kidnapping for ransom; and pirated CDs and DVDs - not to mention co-opting politicians and seizing political control and influence."

La Familia is a good example of what happens to ideological groups in drug conflicts. La Familia, like the FARC, is essentially a giant gang now with little linkage to the views it once espoused. That is also why vigilante groups in Mexico are not a sign of the end of cartel terror. Al they signify is another player entering the stage.

Hakim Hazim has a useful post in GroupIntel looking at the impact of micro movements like La Familia with potentially macro impact. This is the reality of strategic compression. And he is right to classify La Familia as a radical grouping, comparing them to Hamas:

"La Familia’s propaganda extends into the realm of faith. One could argue that it is a religious movement as well. The cartel’s spiritual leader, Nazario “The Maddest One” Moreno, has solidified his status as the people’s preacher. He has produced a gospel of self-help for downtrodden supporters, justified violence for its active members, and evangelical zeal and slogans to maintain a sense of familiarity with the larger faith. La Famalia spreads its messages of hope, salvation and divine justice through various media outlets. In addition they have given gifts to the poor and employ a large number of people at ten times the national average (nearly $2000 a month). By providing things the state has not: services, money, religious identity and social mobility within the group, La Familia is winning big political points in the guise of religion. The pattern is not much different from that of Hamas, Hezbollah or many other terror networks that work to secure the favor of the people and have a religious ideology as a cover for their action. Radical networks are evolving and increasing their efforts to win the hearts and minds of the people. The cartels are operating without constraint as a law unto themselves."