Former New York governor Eliot Spitzer's patronization of a high-class prostitute, at first glance, does not have much relevance to irregular warfare. When the scandal first broke, I traded jokes with a friend about Spitzer "supporting the arts" through his transactions with Ashley Dupre, who recorded Britney Spears/Christina Aguilera imitation music when she was not servicing rich and powerful men. In Los Angeles and New York, there are many people whose careers are delineated with a "slash"--actor/waiter, musician/tennis instructor, writer/tutor, but musician/prostitute is certainly uncommon!
However, as Spin Hunters details in this excellent post, there are many propaganda aspects to the scandal that suggests, at a minimum, that it may not have completely developed organically.
A POSSIBLE PR TAKEDOWN?
All the ingredients were already in place (moralistic governor, hookers, undeniable violation of the law and moral turpitude), but the way the crisis broke (anonymous leak by a "law enforcement official") does lend some credence to the view that Spitzer was the victim of strategic influence.
The most interesting thing about the scandal is the way that it acquired its own momentum through the persona of Ms. Dupre. One would think that the end of Spitzer's career would peak the feeding frenzy. But the character and internal drama of the prostitute--her music, various online profiles, lurid photos, and Lifetime Channel-style story of running away from home, kept media attention buzzing.
The story morphed from a simple tale of a powerful man who betrayed his family and sullied his office. Now Spitzer becomes, unconsciously in the public mind, a kind of pedophile who exploited a desperate young woman not much older than his own eldest daughter! If this was indeed what Spin Hunters calls "black public relations," it was most effective because it worked with a pre-existing setup, shaped it a little, and let it evolve without interference. And whatever the cause, Spitzer's public shaming certainly was successful in burying his larger public policy objectives.
DECAPITATION PROPAGANDA AND NON-STATE POTENTIAL
A weakness of large organizations that become closely identified with the persona of their leaders is that targeting those outsized characters can fatally weaken them. While some propaganda focuses on using the misdeeds of middle-managers or low-rung personnel against organizations, it is not as successful as targeting leadership. The individuals involved can be punished and written off as "bad apples." Target a charismatic CEO, legislator, statesman, or movement leader and you tarnish the organization as a whole. That is why history is replete with decapitation propaganda strikes.
Governments have usually been ahead in this field. With massive information apparatus of the state, the opportunities for digging up dirt are limitless. However, private actors are quickly closing the gap. As we have witnessed over the last half-century of electoral politics, political operatives have become consummate professionals at "opposition research." Two-fisted, mobbed-up private investigators like Anthony Pellicano are slowly being replaced by intelligence community veterans who are increasingly "leaving the Company to snoop on your company," as Portfolio reports.
CYBER ASSASSINATION
Technology has also increased the opportunity for the most devious kind of black propaganda. Defense Tech has an intriguing post on the concept of "Cyber Assassination:"
“Cyber assassination” is when an individual is unaware that he or she is the subject of a cyber attack designed to discredit them and to call into question his or her credibility or loyalty.
Here's a possible scenario: A senior personin the CIA is working on a case and is disrupting the enemy’s activities or getting closer to uncover covert enemy operatives. A smart enemy might attack the leader or others involved in the investigation in an effort to slow down or derail the efforts to expose them. They may choose to hack the individual’s laptop and place damaging emails that allude to a pay-off on their hard drive. Then all that is required is a subtle leak that gets back to the CIA and you can imagine the rest.
A second example could be a politician who is pushing for sanctions against a country and they hack their computer and put pornography on the hard drive. A covert leak of this information results in an investigation and public disclosure of the porn on the hard drive. This individual’s ability to gain or maintain support for their interest in sanctions would be undoubtedly damaged.
You can prove a computer has been compromised (hacked). However, it is virtually impossible to say definitively that a computer has not been hacked. Our ability to defend against this type of assault on individuals in the political, academic, business or industrial spotlight is very limited. For whatever reason people believe the bad and explaining how the compromising materials unknowingly got on their computer hard drive would be almost impossible. Who knows, many of these individuals may have already been set-up and their computers hacked and the damaging evidence planted. Now the enemy patiently waits for the time they need to leak this information to further their cause. Who will be their target now?
While these kind of attacks will certainly be a part of future strategic influence, the Spitzer model will continue to predominate. Many people with public relations problems really do sell the very rope that they will be hanged with, and the most effective kind of takedowns are those that can evolve organically, with a minimum of interference from the influence operator.
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