ANALYSIS: THE WAR OVER THE SURGE

William S. Lind looks at the effects of the surge, and attacks McCain's championing of it as the sole reason behind the reduction in violence in Iraq. Lind's analysis echoes that of Middle East experts and military analysts (Juan Cole, John Nagl, Michael O' Hanlon, etc) interviewed here, many of whom ascribe a range of outside factors to the reduction. Cole and the more left-leaning of the experts focus on non-military developments such as Al Qaeda in Iraq's loss in support among the Sunnis and the ethnic cleansing in Iraqi urban environments, while Nagl and O'Hanlon focus on the change in US strategy that allowed the MNF to co-opt and direct the Sunnis that made up the Anbar Awakening councils.

Nearly every expert describes the gains as reversible, which supports Lind's overall point that the effect of the surge was tactical rather than strategic. The much-hoped for political reconciliation is not forthcoming, and Iraq remains as fragile as ever. And by empowering the Sunnis, we have created a force that will challenge a Shiite central government that supports Iran. There are too many variables left in the equation that could worsen the situation--and an overstretched American military needed to stabilize Afghanistan is ill-equipped to deal with those eventualities. Not to mention, the majority of the Iraqi populace seeks an American exit and opposes status of force (SOFA) agreements that would legitimize a long-term American presence. The best course of action remains a withdrawal of some sort--a view that the White House itself supports with its "time horizon" of American disengagement. 

Yet, I think that opponents of the war (including myself) must admit error when we predicted that the surge would have little to no positive effect or would worsen the situation. Additionally, if American withdrawal occurs, it will be due to the Anbar Awakening's dampening of the violence. John Robb's "open-source militias" created enough controlled chaos to temporarily stabilize the situation.  As Fabius Maximus noted, I wasn't alone in my error.

The major 4GW experts were largely correct about the Iraq War in terms of its costs and benefits to the Coalition states who waged it.  The costs in money and blood are far greater than initially forecasts, the benefits few or none. However, although the war continues, and we can only speculate as how and when it ends, the extreme forecasts now seem unlikely.  Unless something happens to radically change the situation, such as US strike at training camps in Iran or a massive terrorist strike in Iraq or Iran that destabilizes the situation.  This aspect of their forecasts were inaccurate (again, depending on future events).

4GW theory failed to account for the ability of US forces under Petraeus and Kilcullen to shape the situation on the ground and the surprising resilience of Maliki's government. Of course, from the perspective of grand strategy, the costs incurred in Iraq to the United States' armed forces and greater international interests do not justify the gains even in the most optimistic of current predictions. Barring a worsening of violence (always possible) Iraq will likely continue to be an unstable, ethnically divided state necessitating some kind of foreign assistance to remain whole. But the darker predictions (e.g. Martin Van Creveld's image of US troops fleeing Iraq in a repeat of 1975 Saigon) have not come to pass. At least, not yet.

Iraq remains a fundamentally chaotic and fluid environment of inter-sectarian, transnational, factional, and criminal influence. It remains to be seen how it will end. The conflict defies easy answers, pat formulas, and political slogans. We should be suspicious of those who offer them.

Comments

[Sven Ortmann]

O'Hanlon is a loudmouth, not an expert.

[A.E.]

I don't think too highly of his opinions either, but I didn't call him an "expert"-- I included him among "experts and analysts." You're free to draw your own conclusions as to which one he is.

[Aaron]

1100+ American soldiers dead since the start of the surge. That was the fear.

Now the situation is the definition of the term quagmire:
security gains that are "reversible" and transient. The threat of doom if we do leave.