Gaza: To the Bitter End?

Evaluating irregular conflict is extremely difficult. So we may benefit here from taking a look at each actors' objective and means of achieving it. Israel's objective is rather difficult to determine- as listening to the differing statements offered by the Israeli government and squaring it with some of their actions only creates more confusion. The stated cause of the operation is to stop the rockets, but the Israeli government has not clearly defined whether or not is seeking to send a message to Hamas, reinforce its deterrent capability, or destroy Hamas as a governing actor in Gaza.

Hamas' long-term strategic objective is also rather opaque, despite its stated goal of destroying the "Zionist entity." They are more pragmatic than commonly believed, but also are not necessarily actors Israel and the United States can "work with." In the short term, however, their goal is to survive, and like Hezbollah in 2006, regenerate their capabilities and cement their hold on the population's loyalties. Without a ground invasion, Israel is unlikely to harm Hamas to a point where it cannot regenerate its capabilities.

Perhaps the proper analogy here is to the misuse of antibiotic drugs. Not taking all of the pills leaves some bacteria alive--and immune to the antibiotic. Then, they reproduce antibiotic-resistant spawn. Military force, no matter how severe, can be endured by insurgents--they will acclimate themselves to it like the surviving bacteria do with antibiotics. If Israel's goal is to reinforce its deterrent, it is doing an extremely poor job.

The IAF's targeting--aided by six months of high-level intelligence gathering--has noticeably improved since 2006. It is also likely that special forces operations--if not ongoing already--may commence prior to a ground assault. But if current trends continue the basic situation may not change much. Ralph Peters sees this as a measure to buy Israel time. But strategy is more than a process of moving from one tactical process to the next, whatever the cost.

A ground assault may change the situation--it would indicate an Israeli desire to completely eliminate Hamas' infrastructure. Despite hype about Hamas' enhanced paramilitary capabilities, I see such an action as within Israel's means if the political will exists. But assuming responsibility for a resentful, seething Gaza teeming with Hamas operatives may be a worse outcome than a cease-fire that leaves Hamas in nominal control. In any event, we should look--with open eyes--at how the events of the next few days unfold.

Comments

[subadei]

Very much like the anti-biotic metaphor and agree that if this op is limited to the IAF it will be, to a degree, 2006 all over again.

[A.E.]

A ground invasion isn't a panacea either though.