Rethinking Security

Navalism and Evangelism

Many new strategic theories are accompanied by an attitude of evangelism. Those who create them are not just selling a method of warfare but a kind of totalizing philosophy that sees the destiny of peoples and nations in a certain style of combat. There is little way of explaining Alfred Thayer Mahan and his theories other than the frame of evangelism.

Blueprint for Action

John P. Sullivan pointed me to a very fascinating article in the Dallas Morning News that has gone under the radar so far. It looks like the Feds are drawing up a blueprint for joint counter-cartel operations in Mexico:  

"Alarmed by spiraling drug violence along their shared border, U.S. and Mexican officials say they foresee an enhanced U.S. role in the battle against powerful cartels, including joint operations that could involve private American contractors or U.S. military and intelligence personnel."

At least in the operational sense, this is a strong move in the right direction. This is essentially a classical Foreign Internal Defense (FID) mission setup optimized for the terrorism/criminal netwar era, with a combination of advisers and contractors. Contractors, however demonized, can play a good role in training and organizing foreign personnel provided they are directed (and held accountable) as agents of the US government--especially when a discreet footprint is the only option available. Think, for example, of MPRI's work training the Croats in the Bosnian war that finally enabled them to crush the Bosnian Serbs and pivot to destroy the Croatian Serbs holding the Krajina pocket.

I found this comment by a University of Texas professor end of the article very interesting:

"I really characterize this as a civil war, even if it's not formally declared. ...We're seeing all the casualties of a war, people murdered, people wounded, people fleeing their homes, social disintegration and chaos. This is more like Afghanistan than Colombia, with regional, powerful chieftains who operate with complete authority, oftentimes through graft and corruption."

This is really the essence of criminal insurgency--a criminal non-state actor waging violent war against the government, and power being directed into the hands of warlords. Warlordism has historically really only ended by three or four outcomes--unification by a strong ruler, a commercial/technological/social change that centralizes power, or the spread of a strong unifying ideological or religious movement.

Failing Mexico and Failing Ourselves

I have an new op-ed about Mexico and security issues in the Huffington Post.

Threats in the Age of Obama

Michael Tanji's new edited volume Threats in the Age of Obama is now available on Amazon.com. Threats in the Age of Obama is a valuable contribution to the ever-increasing literature on emerging threats and 21st century conflict. Dan tdaxp, War and Health's Christopher Albon, "Mountainrunner" Matt Armstrong, Shane Deichman, Matt Devost, Bob Gourley, Art Hutchinson, Samuel Liles, Adrian Martin, Gunnar Peterson, Cheryl Rofer, Mark Safranski, Steve Schippert, Tim Stevens, and Shlok Vaidya are just some of the blogosphere names that have contributed. I've contributed a chapter on complexity, information, and cyberculture. Be sure to pick it up!

Robb Looking For Work

I second Shlok's comments here. John Robb is a truly rare systemic thinker who will be an asset to any organization--civilian or military--that seeks to adapt to coming changes in network organization and geopolitics.

Digital Transparency

It remains to be seen whether the expansive transparency scheme promised by President Obama will become a reality. But if he does, it will be a evolutionary step towards rebuilding American trust in government. Lack of trust fuels the growth of conspiracy theories and the popularity of sites like Wikileaks. The image of the emotionless, shades-wearing "man in black" has been a mainstay in American popular culture since the 1970s and has turned many talented individuals away from government service. Making government work look good again should be a long-term priority, especially in the national security field. This would also have a marginal impact abroad, especially in the inspiration of pro-democracy reformers abroad. However, it is hard to expect it having too large of an international impact.

Of course, the flip side of this is that information doesn't exactly equal clarity. The new administration may bombard the American people with marginalia and hide the things that truly should be transparent. Additionally, even if it does make good on its promise to err on the side of transparency the public might not pay attention, as government documents are not known for scintillating prose or brevity. Thus, the same rumors and conspiracies may persist because the public simply refused to pay attention to the document on hand. The administration will point to the document, but it is hard to imagine this staunching a viral rumor that is juicy enough. Still, this is an extremely encouraging step towards building a more transparent government.

Brazil's Security Barrier, Israel, and Criminal Insurgency

Conor Foley has a polemical piece in The Guardian about the decision by authorities in Rio de Janeiro to wall off a violence-plagued favela from the rest of the city. Brazil is increasingly plagued by drug violence so intense that Foley likens it to a civil war, and the middle class is tired of being sniped at by coked-out kids with AK-47s who deal drugs in the favelas. The obvious parallel here is to the barrier separating the Palestinian territories from Israel proper. Foley believes that the Brazilian barrier should provoke international outrage, but doesn't.

Why? Foley doesn't tell us, but two things are apparent. Frequent readers know that I have a powerful loathing for New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, but one of the few good things he wrote was his book From Beirut to Jerusalem. Friedman wrote that Israel was a "super-story" because of its biblical history--which encompasses the heritage of many different faiths, cultures, and nations. As a "light unto nations" it will always receive more attention and scrutiny than other nations. Second, crime is usually viewed as a domestic rather than international problem, despite the fact that crime in Latin America has reached the level of criminal insurgency. Criminal violence there is just as vicious as any civil war.

Unfortunately, walling off the problem is not likely to have much effect. This is why the Brazilian police's adoption of counterinsurgency tactics for policing favelas is encouraging news. That being said, without a good political-social strategy and achievable goals it will be a noble (but useless) effort. Keep your eyes on how "urban COIN" policing goes in the favela--this is the alternative.

Obama and Soft Power

Much has been written about Obama and "soft power" projection in foreign policy. So is Obama's impending closing of the Guantanamo Bay prison camp and other changes of policy likely to impact world opinion? Yes and no. On one hand, the prison camp stands as a symbol of American double standards and will attract opposition like a magnet. It is an ostentatious symbol. But it's not likely to have as big an effect on public opinion as many believe. Obama's election it itself provided a massive reboot to America's image, but the sources of anti-Americanism are more systematic than personal.

Bush, an exceptionally ham-handed president , was totally blind to the ways his actions would be perceived overseas. This is especially ironic in light of his acumen for domestic politics, which has been greatly underrated by American political commentators. But anti-Americanism stems from policies that long predate either Obama or Bush---the legacy of the Cold War-era struggle between America and Cuba in Latin America comes to mind here. Anti-Americanism as a whole is an emotional reaction to geopolitical and cultural aspects of American primacy. And it will not go away no matter how many concessions a President makes to world opinion.

If we are in a truly multilateral era, as some say, will that lessen anti-Americanism? This is superficially plausible, as the global protests against China and the strong European suspicion of China shows that their "charm offensive" has not exactly gone according to plan. But it is hard to see China amassing the kind of cultural presence America has as a global symbol, so for the short run the US will continue to suffer the slings and arrows of world public opinion.

Clausewitz, The Rage of the People, and Strategies of Positive Ends

Perhaps the most interesting part of Clausewitz's trinity is the rage of the people, as this quote from the section "The Consequences for Theory" (highlighted by Professor Christopher Bassford)

"War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a remarkable trinity--composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone. .... The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people."

Shane Deichman makes the point that insurgencies today are driven by the rage of the people. This is what ultimately disquieted Jomini when he wrote of popular wars in his Art of War. While conventional war is a funnel that channels the rage of the people into carefully calibrated violence, insurgency is passionate and uncontrolled. Indeed, many insurgents conceptualize violence as a kind of spiritually redeeming act.

China and Internal Threats

According to The New York Times, a new defense white-paper was released in China which one again shows that the regime's chief worry is internal threats. Granted, most outsiders people would not consider Taiwan, a specific threat mentioned in the report, to be an "internal" matter but this is the regime's chosen language. China is also afraid of independence movements in Xinjiang and Tibet. Also hinted it is the regime's fear of maintaining "social stability" in the midst of an economic downturn.

Can China maintain this stability? Hard to tell from the outside, especially given the regime's intensive media efforts to present a picture of harmony--albeit one occasionally disturbed by malicious but isolated traitors to the state. It does say something about the regime's own estimation of these threats that it constantly trumpets them and fiercely clamps down on them. Social theory holds that even stasis must be actively maintained, and phenomena taken for granted must be steadily renewed. Authoritarian states in particular have substantial maintenance costs because they are attempting to hold a social stream together whose natural instinct is to act in ways that violate state authority. Especially when state authority defines ethno-religious, political, and cultural identities outside of the state's to be threats to political order.