Often times a post's comments are more interesting than the post itself. This is the case with a SWJ link to Tom Ricks discussing David Kilcullen's metrics for COIN. Gian P. Gentile makes the most interesting analogy here:
It is time for FM 3-24 to be deconstructed and put back together in a similar way as the American Army’s Active Defense Doctrine was between 1976 and 1982. That previous operational doctrine was thoroughly debated and discussed in open (not bureaucratic) forums and the result of that debate was a better operational doctrine for the time commonly referred to as Airland Battle . In short, FM 3-24 today is the Active Defense Doctrine of 1976. It is incomplete and the dysfunction of its underlying theory becomes clearer and clearer every day. We need a better and complete operational doctrine for counterinsurgency.
The "Active Defense" doctrine Gentile refers to is the 1976 version of Field Manual 100-5 Operations. Informed by the 1972 Yom Kippur War and General Trevor N. Dupuy's largely quantitative study of military history, "Active Defense" emphasized the tactical level and winning the first battle of the opening World War. Of course, given the deep echelonment of Soviet forces winning the first battle might not count for much. The heavily tactical and attrition-based orientation of the manual didn't really play well to NATO numerical weaknesses as well. The linear defense methodology, though virtually ordained by European defense commitments (we could not use an elastic defense) was also problematic. So (as the mostly hagiographic histories state), we moved on to the AirLand Battle Concept and the 80's versions of FM 100-5.
People have made all kinds of accurate criticisms of the manual but I think the larger problem of FM 3-24 is that it doesn't really reflect the kind of conflicts the US is involved in. The Galula 1960s Maoist insurgency template is largely gone. Insurgencies today are much more fractured and the likely role of the US in future conflicts is much different than the kind that Galula wrote about.
The problem is drawing the line between the theoretical faults of the manual and ingrown problems of Policy that have migrated into it. The heavily tactical approach of "Active Defense" for example, was an important result of not being able to utilize an elastic defense because of the harm it would do to NATO's harmony. Similarly, when Policy changes (as I suspect it is due to the present administration's different approach to defense), the doctrine may change as well.
I mean what is the objective of this post, merely informative or something more ?
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Posted by: A.E. | May 12, 2010 at 02:09 PM
Now we see "Active Defenese" in baghdad US Army's doing what they want...
Posted by: buy ambien | August 27, 2010 at 04:30 AM
So, has anything been changed in the FM 3-24? Or are they still referring to this slightly irrelevant manual? Surely the people involved can recognise that it's not created for the type of conflict we face today?
Posted by: Security Tape | February 08, 2011 at 01:28 AM