A new article linked by SWJ points out that military strategists are emphasizing foreign internal defense (FID) over direct counterinsurgency (COIN) involvement. This, of course, is not a new trend - even the most enthusiastic of COIN thinkers have always emphasized a preference for this "light footprint" option over direct involvement. In comments, Crispin Burke points out that we may not have a choice where, when and how we fight. This is true - and not just in irregular warfare as well.
Ideally, grand strategy would determine the most advantageous purpose for the use of military force - a tool of limited utility and high risk. However, the production of grand strategy is not an area that the U.S. excels in. Diplomatic historian Walter McDougall points out that even idealized grand strategies such as the Cold War "Containment" concept had massive flaws. Additionally, the grand strategic and strategic trends and conditions may leave intervention as the best of two bad options.
Steven Metz's description of the Persian Gulf security problem in Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy shows how our involvement in the region and our difficulties with producing a coherent grand strategic approach set the stage for our later interventions in 1991 and 2003. Operation Desert Storm is a perfect example of when action through proxies is no longer tenable and one's hand is forced.
This doesn't mean we have no choice about how to employ force - strategy is not a Greek tragedy. But it does mean that our level of choice in this area - like everything else in life - is not as instrumental as we assume. Clausewitz points out that war doesn't always flows smoothly from a political design, although this is the ideal. What he means is that war is an extension of the interaction between politics and policy, with the added element of violence. And politics is far from something we can always perfectly control. Nor can we predict or control the politics and designs of others or necessarily always shape strategic and grand strategic trends to our will.
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