Some books over the last six-eight months that I enjoyed reading, in no particular order:
1. James J. Schneider, The Structure of Strategic Revolution: Total War and the Roots of the Soviet Warfare State, 1994.
This book is foundational not only for its discussion of the rise of Soviet strategy, but it's very concise and convincing explanation of how the function of what we understand as "strategy" changed significantly from the end of Napoleon's era to the end of the First World War. Schneider, a professor at the Army's School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), makes a significant contribution that is relevant to today's debates over the wars of the future.
2. Steven Metz, Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy, 2007.
There is a reason I keep citing this book: out of all of the Iraq war books it is the only really foundational one, because it puts the conflict within a grand strategic and strategic context going back thirty years. Army War College professor Metz's points about the nature in which we handled the strategic problem of the Persian Gulf and its relationship to our larger grand strategic concepts are excellent. Long after the COIN debate becomes a thing for the history books, the larger strategic currents that Metz discusses will continue to be relevant to American strategy.
3. Jack Kem, Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade, 2006.
Army Command and General Staff Professor Kem cuts through a heady mess of doctrine and theory to describe the rationale and logic of the American system of campaign planning. If you are looking a how strategic objectives are accomplished through the employment of force, this book explains in remarkably clear language the processes involved and how they came to be.
4. Ka Po Ng, Interpreting China's Military Power: Doctrine Makes Readiness, 2004.
In the midst of the COIN vs. anti-COIN battle, it's easy to lose track of the wider spectrum of threats. Aichi Bunkyo University professor Ng looks the evolution of Chinese military doctrine from the Maoist era to the modern day. He casts a refreshing light on the way Soviet, Maoist and more recent MTR/RMA-doctrines have meshed together, eschewing the "Sun Tzu explains everything" theory of Chinese military strategy.
5. James McPherson, Tried by War: Abraham Lincoln as Commander in Chief, 2008.
In a new analysis, Civil War historian McPherson looks at how Abraham Lincoln made himself the center of the war effort. In the words of Joseph Fouche, Lincoln was a "strategic aggregator" who concentrated every detail of the conflict and broke them down into a concrete concept of victory. McPherson's clear and detailed description of Lincoln's victory over the cognitive challenge of war has great applicability today.
6. Gregory W. Ellison, Operational Art: The Missing Link in the Iran-Iraq War, 1988.
Major Ellison, a then-student at SAMS, wrote an interesting analysis of the Iran-Iraq war using the emerging tenets of American operational theory. As an military analysis of the conflict, it has limitations due to its lack of Iranian or Iraqi sources. That being said I am more or less unaware of any single-volume history of the conflict that contains copious Iranian or Iraq documentation. Most of the work on this conflict (such as Dilip Hiro's early 90s history of the conflict or Wagner and Cordesman's "Lessons of Modern War") were written around the late 80s or early 90s. Ellison's thesis examines the campaign processes for both sides, and may be a useful reference to consult the next time a medium-scale Third World conventional conflict breaks out in the region. It is also clear, thoughtful and persuasive.
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