Rethinking Security

Fouche's Magnum Opus

I've searched in vain for a modern Hunter S. Thompson to satirize today's world of foreign policy and national security. But now Joseph Fouche has, after some prodding, expanded some of his more hilarious Twitterings into a farce of biblical proportions. If hearing the words "black swan" and "accidental guerrilla" excites you like the midnight premiere of Iron Man 2 , you have a PowerPoint-shaped dartboard, and you always eat soup with a knife, this entry is for you.

Everyone else will be completely baffled, especially when the George Kennan giant robot emerges in the beginning. It is a truly epic ride that manages to tie everything from the classical historian Ibn Khaldun's theory of civilizational decline to the Python programming language together. I'm frankly amazed he managed to write it without the world spontaneously combusting. But he did!

If you don't want to burrow deep into the inside baseball, his main point is that American strategy is split between two tendencies - the "magic bullet" devised by technocratic professionals and the emergent populist tendency of the crowd (e.g. Walter Russell Mead's Jacksonians). The merge point lies somewhere between the machine dreams of MacNamara's systems analysts and the 19th century P2P empire-building of Manifest Destiny. The problem, as Fouche argues, lies in generating cohesion that can animate the traditional sources of American power.

War is Over (If You Want It?)

Kotare expands on my thoughts on war termination, decisive wars and peace. His post is rich with insights, but I'd like to build on one thought in particular:

"Where you stand will determine when you see a war starting and finishing. In the West, we separate the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-89) from the current Afghan War (2001 - present). But al-Qaeda will see things completely differently. To them there is no distinction. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Western invasion of Afghanistan - these are merely events in one struggle against Western infidels in Afghanistan."

A critical aspect of war termination is whether or not the defeated power accepts that they have lost. And even so, the immediate acceptance of defeat is no guarantee of future peace. To a defeated power seething for revenge or redress, long periods of peace are but an interlude in a long war. That was certainly an aspect of how the French felt in 1914 regarding their humiliating loss in 1870.

It is also tragic how demagogues can skillfully weave old mythos into new hatreds, as Slobadan Milosevic and his allies did in the former Yugoslavia. While Milosevic's ultimate goals were more mundane and greedy, he was able to successfully spin an inflammatory narrative that placed the latest Balkan civil war as one battle in a long war. We all know the result.

The problem is not "ancient hatreds" but how they are exploited by charismatic individuals, feed into larger national myths and coincide with larger events and processes. We aren't automatons driven to fight our neighbor because his ancestor conquered ours three hundred years ago. But outrage, hatred, humiliation and revenge are fungible and renewable assets that can sometimes sadly be remade with the same ease that a popular DJ might cut up and remix a decades old hit record into a modern chart-topper.

Finally, a small (but fanatical) terrorist group such as al-Qaeda will grow more--not less--entrenched within its own distorted ideology of victimhood even as it becomes more marginalized. And it will continue fighting until the last of its operatives are captured or killed.

State-Building/Nation-Building

As usual, I'm a bit late to this discussion on Kilcullen, Boyd and Afghanistan Zenpundit started. However, one interesting aspect is the conceptual linkage made here with the theory of state-building and COIN. This is interesting primarily because of the contrast between state-building and the newer concept of "nation-building."

State-building is as old as states themselves. The sociologist Charles Tilly's work on the coercive elements of state-building are rarely referenced in today's talk about proto-states, COIN and strategy despite their towering influence and Tilly's conclusions about the linkage of state-making and war-making. The concept of "nation-building" is difficult to define, but can best be described in a modern sense as the building (through political and development aid) of a modern democratic state.

The primary difference between the two is that nation-building has broadly liberal aims, which can conflict with the coercive means sometimes used to bring them about. State-building, on the other hand, is the fashioning of a unified state through political-military-economic means. They overlap of course, but the idealized way we look at "nation-building" is much different than the often harsh reality of state-building. It is, broadly, the difference between the United Nations' vision of post-conflict transition in places such as Liberia and Turkey's authoritarian modernizer Kemal Ataturk.

While COIN is often described as armed nation-building (and can be at times), it is in reality a small facet of state-building. Take, for example, the prototypical Cold War scenario of a group of American advisers in a underdeveloped Third World state helping build up indigenous armed forces and civilian institutions in order to quell a communist revolt. While the immediate goal is narrow (help the locals defeat the Soviet or Chinese-backed guerrilla army), the mission takes place in the context of the host nation's overall struggle to consolidate the power of the central government.

State-building is often a violent and sometimes cruel process, as alternate power centers are marginalized by the expansion of centralized power. Even when the process is not overly violent, the prospect of violence is omnipresent. Had the crafty French Cardinal Richelieu been transplanted to some of today's battlefields, he would not be surprised or shocked by the level of violence or Sopranos-style maneuvering. His portrayal as a schemer in The Three Musketeers is well-deserved, although Dumas' rather cartoonish rendering of him as a Saturday morning cartoon bad guy is simplistic.

This isn't to endorse the simplistic (and largely modern-day revisionist) concept of "Roman COIN" that Crispin Burke rightly lambastes here. Legitimacy is very important, and even the most coldly realist of ancient philosophers understood this intently. Political power is not solely gained through violence or destruction, it is the product of holistic political, military, ideological and economic struggle. Lastly, Dave Dillege rightly points out that our irregular warfare doctrine must ultimately be congruent with American values.

But we should be clear about the morally complex nature of the processes we are indirectly aiding through participation in counterinsurgency and foreign internal defense missions abroad--especially since local patrons will often drag us into their own power disputes and agendas. And as Zenpundit notes, our evaluation of the suitability of such ventures should hinge on a realistic assessment of its relationship to core interests as well as the suitability of the local patron.

Naval Open Source Warfare?

Chris Rawey has an interesting post up at Information Dissemination on potential opposing force adaptations that range beyond traditional "anti-access" threats:

"So what will the next ten years of OSW bring to maritime conflicts?
- A proliferation of sea and beach-launched small (read model airplane size) UAVs utilized by non-state actors to help target their water-borne IEDS and anti-ship cruise missiles
- Small, randomly strewn maritime IEDS (mines) through vital commercial choke points – think the Verrazano Narrows between Staten Island and Brooklyn vice Strait of Hormuz. Really, the whole “E” component isn’t necessarily, just some sinister looking boxes and an emailed threat alone is enough to disrupt traffic for a while in any given port
- Commercially available UUVs designed for oceanography converted into torpedoes
- Cell phones and social media used to agitate “flash mobs” of local fishing vessels in order to block the movement of navy or merchant vessels."

It goes without saying of course, that countermeasures will be employed and the cycle of offense and defense will continue. The small, light torpedo boat concept advocated by the Jeune Ecole naval movement in late 19th century Europe, for example, was not as decisive as the French naval theorists thought. But the possibilities outlined here are still worry of study and concern.

Evolution of Strategic Distance

I'm writing something on this myself, but I want to point out Patrick Porter's excellent essay on how globalization's reach doesn't negate the importance of priority-setting in strategy.

Especially in light of the attempted Times Square bombing, the question of how foreign and domestic threats connect is indeed at the core of many of today's strategic debates.

CBRND Wiki Project

If you have knowledge about Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense (CBRND) issues, please help the blogosphere's biggest CBRND guy Jason Sigger build up his wiki on the subject. While 24's "suitcase nuke of the week" plots can be amusing to watch, CBRND is far more than just that. And Jason's been doing yeoman's work to make us collectively smarter on this important issue. His wiki project, once completed, should be an excellent resource for policymakers, journalists, bloggers, and the general public.

New Reading

In the spirit of Zenpundit's recent post, here's some books I've picked up recently.

• Edward Bruce Hamley, The Operations of War, 1909.
• Williamson Murray and Allen Millet, A War To Be Won: Fighting the Second World War, 2000.
• Edward Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire , 2010.

Hamley's book (I have the 1909 edition) was an important text for British officers in the 19th century and early 20th century. Murray and Millet's book is a rather superb one-volume work on the solely military aspects of World War II. And I'm hoping to learn from Luttwak how the Byzantine Empire survived so long.

War Termination: More Messy?

Duck of Minerva's Stephanie Carvin makes an interesting observation about the end of conflict and the nature of victory:

"While I remember the day Saddam Hussein surrendered in 1991, our generation, by and large, will likely never know such an occasion. Despite the fact that the West has been fighting a war for several years in Afghanistan, in all likelihood, we will not, at 3pm on any given day, know that the war our nations have been fighting is over. Such a day is impossible, of course, because we have no idea what victory will look like. Certainly we could postulate some ideas – having Afghanistan become a nation able to credibly (relatively?) defend itself; perhaps as a place where girls can go to school free from attacks and harassment. Or even, more basically, where we can walk away, cross our fingers, and hope that the threat of international terrorism is contained. However, no government or organization has truly been able to articulate a vision for the end of hostilities in Afghanistan.It’s interesting for more than just moral reasons, of course. Much of international law related to warfare is predicated on the idea that there will be such an actual ending to war."

This is true, and a trend observed by Dr. Steven Metz's insightful 2007 monograph Rethinking Insurgency. Contemporary conflicts tend to be less formal and messy, and their multitude of state and sub-state actors often challenges international law. It is important, however, that we don't stretch the larger point about war termination and the recognition of victory too far. Although it is possible to analyze victory and defeat in many conflicts, most do not provide a clear or uncomplicated end.

A seemingly decisive victory such as Operation Desert Storm, did not, in fact, change the larger strategic problem of the Persian Gulf. With Saddam Hussein's armed forces beaten but intact and his larger ambitions unresolved, the 1990s to the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 featured constant skirmishes between the United States and Iraq. Most of these were pinpoint strikes on specific Iraqi military installations, save for the more large-scale Operation Desert Fox in 1998. In practical terms, some thinkers argue that it is conceptually useless to separate the two American wars in Iraq due to the continuity of small-scale violence from 1991 to 2003.

Israel is another case in point. The 1967 Six Day War is one of the most decisive wars in the 20th century, yet from 1967 up to 1970 Egypt engaged Israel in what is now known as the War of Attrition. While more or less undeclared, the conflict was an intense limited war in the mid-century Third World mode. And just three years later, Egypt and its allies would attack in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The military history of Europe before the 20th century is also one of near-constant warfare, with brief respites in which the threat of war loomed high.

In a new analysis, historian John Lewis points out that decisive wars that provide definite resolution are rare for the simple reason that the given victory must be both overwhelming and psychologically and ideologically shocking to deprive an adversary of the will to continue. This is echoed in Ron Tira's criticism of Effects-Based Operations (EBO), as Tira points out that the psychological recognition of defeat must match the material and human devastation to truly convince an adversary to submit. Truly decisive wars in this mold are rare. But the popular imagination is fixated on World War II - in many ways an outlier - as the conventional norm.

Pinky and the Brain: A Parable

A while ago, Joseph Fouche of Committee of Public Safety had a very thoughtful post about the "tragedy of the geopolitical nerd." Fouche argued that the titular individual suffers from an acute (and rare) vexation:

"He suffers from a contradiction: he can see the narrow slices of reality that he specializes in exquisite and even excruciating detail. Unfortunately, he sees the world outside as a mixture of his tiny area of expertise writ large and a land populated by large bright shiny ideals that he can see in all of its fine shades. Based on this perception, he can formulate responses perfectly calibrated to exploit his unique domain knowledge to remake the world in the image of his vision. However, the nerd’s intentions suffer from a major defect: they are usually fatally out of sync with the means available to achieve that vision."

Fouche offered as an example George Kennan, who formulated an elaborate design for confronting Soviet power only to become embittered over what he viewed as an inadequate execution. Fouche's point was that grand strategies have to be tailored to realities of American politics - e.g they cannot be overly complex or nuanced.

I propose a corollary to this metaphor: Pinky and the Brain.

At first blush, a Saturday morning cartoon show involving two scheming laboratory mice would not have much relevance to strategy. However, the show is a very apt metaphor for strategy. Brain constantly generates complex plans for taking over the world. Unfortunately, these plans must be executed by Pinky, a hyperactive mouse with a Cockney accent. Needles to say, the plans always go awry. It isn't entirely Pinky's fault, however. The plans Brains generates are too complex to be implemented (sometimes hilariously so) and usually contain a single point of failure. He also fails to take into account Pinky's role in the actual implementation of the plans.

The point here is not necessarily that Brain would have been better off designing simpler plans. The real lesson is that Brain's model of planning is an ideal one. He resolutely refuses to accept the strategic conditions he must work with. So what's the link for today?

After 9/11, it was hard not to go to the Current Affairs section of one's local Barnes and Noble or turn on CNN without seeing an earnest exposition of the need for the United States to embrace some favored aspect of Cold War strategy. Peter Beinart's 2006 book The Good Fight, for example, explicitly tries to weave a grand strategy out of the unraveled threads of early Cold War liberalism. But no amount of well-wishing will bring Harry Truman back to life. Harkening back to a supposed halycon era of the Eisenhower National Security Council (NSC), the firmness of the Berlin Airlift, or ping-pong diplomacy in Mao's China is not practically useful.

And as Max Hastings notes in his latest biography of Winston Churchill, many revered historical leaders were not as strategically sound as we popularly believed. Churchill was wedded to the often simplistic Basil Liddell-Hart-induced vision of a "British Way in Warfare" based on indirect strategy. This resulted in Britain committing itself (and its allies) to a variety of strategically peripheral battles of little direct benefit. Churchill offered the moral backbone to oppose Hitler where little existed otherwise, but that alone was not sufficient to win the war.

It's not that past experience can't offer us perspective, point out errors in our present approach, or even point the ways to the future. It is that grand strategy based on nostalgia for the past and a conscious desire to replicate the success of an oft-mythologized hero is symptomatic of a refusal to engage with the present. And that's just as sensible as trusting your plans for world domination over to a hyperactive lab mouse.