Jason Sigger, commenting on a recent article on strategic planning, is ultimately pessimistic about the idea of a centrally organized body to produce viable national security planning beyond the short-term.
On the same note Daniel Drezner observes that China's international moves of late have been rather rash: "China has badly overestimated how it can translate its financial capabilities into foreign policy leverage," but at the same time notes "A lot of commentators notice [China's] material advantages, and then mistakenly infer that China has pursued a brilliant grand strategy. At this point, however, China's continued rise seems to be occurring in spite of strategic miscalculations, not because of them." This brings us to a larger point: perhaps more important than a brilliant grand strategy per se is the cushion for error you have available at any given time.
If you are, say, a continental power bounded by two powerful adversaries and cannot sustain a protracted war, then you better be damn well sure that the operational concept you've developed through judicious study of the battle of Cannae and extrapolated to the strategic level works out fine. On the other hand, if you're an island nation with a really good Navy and you've just lost to a bunch of uppity colonists operating with the aid of your chief rival, things might not be so bad. In another 100 years you'll be sipping tea in India, engaging in a strategically dubious proxy conflict against the Russians for control of Central Asia, and producing dreadful novels about creepy men in haunted mansions and the women who love them.
The larger question behind all of the grand strategy discussions is whether America has a lesser margin for error than before, as Drezner implies. What do you think?
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