The Strategic Game: Kiras on Strategy

Unlike Zenpundit, (the link shows his amazingly large and well-regulated reading schedule) I tend to jump around with books I read. So I'm still working on these books, although I did finish reading A War To Be Won a week or so ago. On that note, I thought Millett and Murray did an remarkable job of writing a purely military one-volume history of the war that put all of the large battles, major operations, and campaigns of the conflict in every theater of the war in proper perspective.

I recently also read Special Operations and Strategy: From World War II to the War on Terrorism by James D. Kiras. Although this book touches on the somewhat narrow topic of Special Operations Forces (SOF), it has a much wider field of vision and echoes the message of Joseph Fouche's "Strategy of the Headless Chicken" post.

First, Kiras gives us a run-through of strategic theory ranging from Hans Delbrück to J.C. Wylie as well as theories of "strategic paralysis" from J.F.C. Fuller to the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Kiras argues (correctly) that attrition has been historically misunderstood as a kind of mindless slog. Rather, attrition is a cumulative strategy that involves progressively raising the adversary's cost of fighting through a variety of both material and psychological means. The competing strategy, annihilation, is a rapid and violent action of some sort that either destroys the opponent's army or cripples his means to resist in one blow (such as a computer network strike).

Strategic paralysis theory (which he identifies mainly as a province of interwar maneuver theorists and some airpower theorists) is a subset of annihilation strategy which leverages technology. Kiras points out that those seeking strategic paralysis often lack the information, strength, or decisiveness needed to implement it. A competent industrial-era (or beyond) enemy with enough capabilities to effectively resist is unlikely to allow themselves to be out-maneuvered Liddell-Hart style, or put to flight with some bombing of select industrial nodes.

With this prelude, Kiras then points out that SOF are best employed in a manner that enhances the strategic performance of regular forces. This does not mean tying them down with tactical support tasks, like the Allies did in Kiras's case study of the 1944 Normandy campaign. Rather, it means best leveraging them to accomplish tasks uniquely suited to their capabilities that add to the conventional "hammer" already pressing the opponent. The actions of the Long Range Desert Group (LRDG) in psychologically and materially pressing the Afrika Korps through raiding missions is an example Kiras employs. Kiras also discusses the "non-linearity" of attrition, employing complex systems theory to look at how the additive effects of a series of small raids coordinated in a campaign can produce large systemic consequences for an opponent.

Kiras effectively debunks what he calls the "handful of heroes" style of analysis on the subject, noting that the strategic effects of individual missions that some authors blow out of proportions for cinematic effect is marginal at best. To those who might retort by pointing out Entebbe, Kiras insightfully notes how Entebbe harmonized with the larger Israeli policy of that period. This, however, isn't going to stop me from watching The A-Team. If Rampage Jackson (playing Mr. T's old role) does not have Mr. T's massive gold jewelry, however, I might be upset.

Despite the title, Kiras only addresses the War on Terror in passing. This a book whose main historical source text is World War II, and rightly so given the nature of his thesis. Nevertheless, Kiras does a service by outlining (with copious historical examples) the strategic utility and limitations of an arm of policy that is being used extensively today in a rather controversial manner. His larger explorations of strategy are also persuasive and insightful.

Comments

[Ed Beakley]

Other than notation by John Sullivan, I very seldom find mention of (now admiral)William McRaven's book SPECOPS. I first read looking to better understand (not being either terrorist or SF)operations similar to terrorist small unit approaches in doing red-team research for a civ-military port incursion exercise.

The idea of "relative superiority" seems most ignored. I have discussed with Chet Richards in regard to idea of recovering from "negative OODA Loop" starts and written bits and pieces but can't quite get the time (or brains) to get my arms around. Thoughts? ([email protected])

[A.E.]

Ed,

Sent you an email - sorry I didn't get back to this sooner.

[James Kiras]

Adam, thanks so much for the kind review indeed. I do appreciate it. I'm looking forward to reading more of your blogs and chatting with you offline.

Ed, the concept of relative superiority is not forgotten so much as it implicit in most competent military planning and operations. It's tied intimately with the concept of schwerpunkt at the operational level of war. In ADM McRaven's book, it's tied exclusively to direct action missions (raids) at the level of tactics and execution. I'd be happy to discuss offline if you'd like.