Operational Theory and Metaphor

In Azar Gat's History of Military Thought, Gat argues that organized military science in the 18th century shifted from descriptions of how to train, equip, and motivate men to the conceptualization and direction of operations. The idea of the "line of operation" originated as a Jominian concept that encompassed the relationship between a base of operations, lines of communication, lines of maneuver, and decisive points in the operation. In turn, Jomini developed these ideas from the more restrictive definition offered by Henry Lloyd, who saw the the line of operation as a line that clarified the relationship solely between marching army and its supply depots.

There's an interesting discussion in the Small Wars Council right now about the evolution of the concept in US doctrine, specifically the growth of "logical lines of operation" (LOOs). LOOs are obviously disengaged from the Line of Operation's physical context, and instead serve as something of a clarifying device for integrating a number of different objectives together (security, information operations, etc).

Chris Paparone (author of a number of different works on operational theory) jumped in to make the most interesting point:

Several years into the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which are characterized more by FID- and COIN-oriented activities and goals, doctrinaires searched for a way to define the metaphysical (“logical”) links between military activities as they relate to more nebulous goals like “population security,” “support to insurgents,” and “increasing legitimacy of the host government.” These writers searched for the additional abstraction to describe how to intertwine activities of other agencies and organizations that are nonmilitary in nature (and may constitute the main effort with the military-in-support). Army doctrinaires called these “lines of effort” while joint doctrinaires labeled them “logical lines of operations.” Keep in mind that these efforts are geared to desirable social and psychological change; hence, are not clearly tied to the physical world. Logical lines of operation are more existential (subjective, interpretive, infused with human-created meaning, etc.) in that they address PEOPLE -- changing minds, social norms, ideas about legitimacy, and so on. In essence, you are orienting military activities and nonmilitary activities on the opinions, values, and attitudes of a POPULATION (be they good guys, bad guys, &/or “fence sitters”).

In essence, as Paparone later argues, the problem with this conceptualization is that it seems to visualize a direct and entirely linear input-output process between an operational-level military or interagency process and a causal effect in a complex social system. The thrust of the emerging Design movement is to use modern social science and complexity theory to try to better orient the span of military activities towards the holistic operational system as well.

The larger problem with Logical Lines of Operation (LOO), though, lies with the disaggregation between the physical meaning and the abstract one. This is something of a problem with modern Western operational theory in general. Many operational theory concepts as conceptualized in the US (such as the debate about the Center of Gravity concept) use abstract and/or metaphorical models to better orient force. The problem, however, is that the abstractness of these models leaves their meaning very fuzzy and in turn problematizes the relationship between the metaphor, the employment of combat power, and the expected output or effect.

The American understanding of the Center of Gravity (COG) concept, for example, sometimes leads to nearly Talmudic parsing over what the COG is, even when the concept (as originally conceptualized by Clausewitz) may not apply to the situation at hand. If several completely plausible (yet radically different) opponent COGs are produced (as they sometimes are in military analyses of opponents) then the American use of the concept should be examined. In turn, the quest for "effects" led Israeli commanders to tell puzzled subordinates to "render the enemy incoherent" in 2006. And to go even far back, we can look at JFC Fuller's concept of striking the "brain" of an army--something that physically did not exist.

The chief risk is that in employing metaphorical concepts as ordering devices for the use of force, one directs force at things that either do not exist (such as JFC Fuller's "brain of the army"). Or, for that matter, there is the risk that the ordering schemas incorrectly manage the translation of force into political power or misdiagnose the relationship between the two entirely. EBO's flaw was that it visualized human societies as closed systems, for example. As I wrote with Crispin Burke back in February, new concepts and debates might clarify this doctrinal controversy a bit, although there are some risks.

Comments

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I've always been leery of planners who claim to have identified a center of gravity in a campaign. Planning checklists almost seem to beg planners to identify a COG, with many planners almost haphazardly inserting their all-purpose, magic-bullet solution. The truth is that you are right, we need to review our use of "center of gravity" in operational thought.

[A.E.]

I think we need to find out what works for us and our strategic culture and requirements. Plenty of armies have won without ever thinking of the COG concept, although they might have intuitively identified a COG or defined it by another name.

If the COG concept is too difficult for the American military to implement, then we should find a way of planning operations that fits with the "army we have."