Light vs. heavy is probably one of the most basic (and contentious) questions in defense policy. Go light and you can go anywhere quickly, but these forces tend to be less survivable and depend to a greater degree on luck to survive. Thomas K. Adams argued in his book-length critique of the "post-industrial Army" that the lighter Army After Next depended to an unhealthy degree on unreliable technology to support information dominance. But heavy involves a larger logistical tail and a significant amount of redundancies. It's a never-ending debate, between J.F.C. Fuller-types who want an army of small specialists and counterparts arguing for a larger, more diverse heavy force.
That's why I think Loren Thompson, while correct about many of network-centric warfare's myriad failings, is a bit premature in writing an obituary for the concept. Perhaps Future Combat Systems (FCS)-type projects are dead for now, but the vision of a smaller, highly networked force is going to keep re-appearing in other guises. Part of it is simply change. Former Sandhurst instructor and military historian Paddy Griffith, a very big influence on the 1993 version of FM 100-5 Operations, has pointed out in his most influential book that in conventional warfare forces have become more and more dispersed since the early 19th century. That, and budget constraints are likely to make land forces shrink by definition.
yes, as you say, "the vision of a smaller, highly networked force is going to keep re-appearing in other guises." arquilla and i were always careful to distinguish our views about "netwar" from others' views about "network-centric warfare" (ncw), in part because the latter often seemed much more about technology than about organization.
Posted by: david ronfeldt | August 08, 2010 at 12:24 PM
I met John a few weeks ago in person at NPS. That place seemed like a great place to live and study.
Posted by: A.E. | August 08, 2010 at 12:42 PM