Clausewitz and Elasticity

In the course of a discussion of the latest Andrew Bacevich article, Seydlitz89 clears up a common misconception about Clausewitz in remarkably clear language:

According to Clausewitz war is made up or a remarkable trinity of passion, chance and the subordination to policy/politics. War is not an independent phenomenon, but part of political intercourse, that is belonging to a larger social whole. Notice that the definition of "politics" here is intentionally broad, encompassing various aspects associated with power in the context of both within and between political communities. Second, this is not the same as seeing war as a "problem solver" since pursuing a policy is not the same as solving a problem, which may be much more complex.

I have intentionally bolded Seydlitz89's point because it is very significant. Perhaps one of the greatest things about Clausewitz's concept of war is its fundamental elasticity - i.e it can be stretched significantly. What Clausewitz is trying to say is not necessarily that every war is the natural result of a carefully planned, linear policy. Rather, it is an outgrowth of a larger "political" (the original meaning in German is very complex) process that results in armed violence by a political actor to achieve a given political result.

This policy may not be objectively rational, but it can be internally consistent given a certain worldview or framework of beliefs. For example, the religious warfare of the Middle Ages may seem bizarre to us today. But if one accepted the religious views of politics inherent in the thinking of many of the actors present during that time, it would be impossible not to conclude that heavenly ideals had very concrete earthly political consequences.

Second, there is a great difference between seeing war as something that ought to solve a policy problem in a certain situation and something that will solve most issues in spite of the consequences. Force is a very blunt instrument that can easily backfire on those who seek to master it---no matter how many elaborate instruments of control we construct to compress the chaos of conflict into an instrumental tool that can be wielded against our enemies. This comes across frequently in Clausewitz's writings, but is often poorly understood by his critics.

There is also a moral difference in seeing force--military, paramilitary, or otherwise--as a tragically common instrument of statecraft and to be casual about employing it. Realists in both the classical and modern sense have in practice been dovish on questions of major use of force and are generally more humble about what force will achieve. Even so, human history since antiquity has featured the successful and unsuccessful utilization of various forms of coercion and it is unlikely that we have grown--or will grow--significantly enlightened enough to cooperate in a manner that eliminates whatever drives us to do so.

Comments

[seydlitz89]

Thank you for this Adam.

I agree with what you have posted, but would like to make a few comments to clarify. I've corrected the typo on my original post btw.

First, Clausewitz's "concept of war" is what a growing body of Clausewitzians describe as "the general theory of war". Both Andreas Herberg Rothe and myself (to a far lesser degree) have been talking about this type of Clausewitzian theory for some time (I think it probably goes back to what Rosinski was writing/talking about in the 1920-40s). The general theory would encompass all wars whereas each specific period of time would have its own "art of war" covering that particular period of political/social development. "On War" is a mixture of both (and other types of theory). I link this with the Clausewitzian concept of "cohesion".

Following Thomas Schelling, whom I´m of course sure you are aware and whose approach is distinctly Clausewitzian imo, there is a distinction between the direct use of force and coercion, coercion being the far more nuanced use of the military instrument.

I just received Andrew Bacevich's new book in the mail and will be very interested to see if the assumptions I made in my post hold up . . .

[A.E.]

Like you I also am dubious about the idea of the "End of Military History," and I also don't really think there such a thing as a "Western" or "Islamic" way of war.

I'm aware of the General Theory as well, but it would have made this post a bit too big for the time in which I wrote it (like my hero Fuller, it was literally at a bar with a band playing in the background).

Schelling is a very underrated theorist today. Maybe that'd be grist for a new post.

[seydlitz89]

JFC Fuller?

I look forward to reading your post on Schelling . . .

[A.E.]

Fuller said he wrote "The Reformation of War" in a dozen hotel bars, with a dozen jazz bands playing in the background. I try to do the same with my blog posts and essays. Tends to liberate your creativity.

There was a lot Fuller was wrong about, but he's undoubtedly one of the most interesting strategic theorists of his time. That's why I strive to emulate his eclectic nature of inquiry when I read and write about defense issues. If he were alive today, he'd probably be a fan of giant robot anime too...