From Normandy to Kandahar?

This New York Times analysis caused a huge stir and a very large Small Wars Journal comment thread. The problem? The story seemed to suggest that today's generals have it harder and must be more "political" than generals of previous eras. Without skipping a beat, the familiar COINdinista vs. COINtra brawl began, and I put a nice tub of movie theater-style popcorn into the microwave, got a frozen fruit smoothie out of the cooler (perhaps Bud Light Lime next time), and relaxed while watching the digital fracas.

This debate---about the relative complexity of irregular vs. conventional operations---has been a recurring one. I have read many analyses arguing either point, and participated in both formal and informal discussions about it. In the essay I wrote with Crispin Burke in February on campaigns, design, and operational art, we took the tack that conventional warfare was also what might be called interactively complex--just of a different character.

There are, I think, two threads of argument here. The first is whether or not irregular vs. conventional is more complex---an argument that will really never be settled. The logistical complexity of a conventional campaign is massive and should not underrated, as is the ability of a competent conventional opponent to frustrate one's designs. However, the granular knowledge needed to solve a complicated irregular policy problem such as what to do about Somalia is also a daunting challenge. The second argument is that it's easier for a conventional task-organized force to downshift to irregular warfare than a COIN Army to fight a typical mechanized skirmish. I do not think anyone disputes the latter.

Perhaps the real difference is simply in aims and use of force. Over the last twenty years we have not had clearly defined policy aims for the use of force. Force has also been limited in character since 1945. Hence the frustration in looking back to World War II--where force could be employed in an unlimited manner and the aim was clearly the defeat of the Axis. What this says is not that either conflict was more complex but that previous generations of American defense thinkers may have had a better handle--at least in one instance--on shaping the military instrument's use than we do today.

Comments

[Joseph Fouche]

It seems that after the bloodletting at Meuse-Argonne that American military doctrine and civilian sensibilities moved towards emphasizing firepower over manpower. This was a rip-roaring success in World War II where 90% of enemy casualties were inflicted by artillery or tactical airpower. Max Hastings' point that soldier for soldier the American infantryman or tanker was not the equal of his German counterparts is probably true. But American tactical airpower and indirect fires were far superior to their German equivalents by Normandy so German manpower superiority was not sufficient.

This pattern of mostly indifferently trained infantry coupled with superior tactical airpower and indirect fires was the American norm until Vietnam. America's opponents eventually found strategies and tactics that countered this advantage helpeShifts in domestic norms, some intentionally fed by America's enemies, helped this along. This has created the dilemma that, in order to counter these tactics and norms, some self-imposed, American tactics have become more manpower intensive as its sensitivity to casualties has increased and its capacity to expend manpower has decreased. This despite the fact that American firepower has never been so potent.

Unless this situation changes, American tactics will be drawn in the direction of being more manpower intensive and less firepower intensive. Nagl's basic insight that after the Gulf War I that no one will ever try and fight us that way again is true, though his particular response to that insight may or may not be universally valid. In the meantime, Fulda Gap purists are just blowing wind until then.

[A.E.]

Yeah, a lot of COINtras protest that they aren't for the Fulda Gap, but none of their writings reference the Army as it was during the 90s, when it was changing into the Force XXI, Army After Next, and then the Modular Force. Seems to be either COIN or AirLand Battle...