Robert Haddick, summarizing a conference talk, describes the Marine Corps' adjustment to the era of "G-RAMMs" (guided rockets, artillery, mortars, and missiles) in amphibious warfare:
"[Undersecretary of the Navy Bob Work] gave a brief outline of that response. First, an adversary G-RAMM capability requires sensors (radar) and an electronic command and control network. Work expressed confidence that U.S. joint forces will be able to achieve electronic network dominance over an adversary in an amphibious objective area. Second, Work noted the difficulty of defending against a modern amphibious assault. Concentrated adversary forces, either at a landing site or in a mobile reserve, will be vulnerable to U.S. precision attack. U.S. landing forces, by contrast, aided by platforms such as V-22, LCAC, and EFV, have a very wide variety of insertion options. In addition, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have allowed the Marine Corps to perfect distributed operations, which will also be an effective technique during amphibious assaults. Finally, Work is counting on the participation of Air Force long-range strike and Army parachute BCTs as force multipliers in a joint campaign."
Work's focus on trying to overcome the G-RAMM problem is all very good news, because if the US is to adopt a strategy of "strategic raiding" outlined by some defense thinkers, competency in forcible entry operations is a basic pre-requisite. Otherwise, there will be no teeth behind the strategic raid concept. Special operations raids and strategic bombing are not a substitute for the ability to quickly and violently execute operational maneuver from the sea if need be. That being said, as Dakota Wood points out later on in the presentation, budgetary difficulties may make the Marines' concept of operation out of reach for the moment.
Oddly enough, as Slapout9 points out in comments, this scenario was rather eerily predicted in 1980s Maneuver Warfare writings, which counseled the prospective Marine commander to choose unlikely spots for landings. Phil Ridderhof also points out that unleashing the volume of suppressive fires that Marines traditionally have used in opposed landing operations may be difficult in today's world due to the problem of populated areas and restrictive rules of engagement.
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