Stranded on Land?

At the end of Philip Tomio's review of Marine Corps operating challenges is an interesting paragraph. I have bolded the last sentence in particular.

Early efforts to develop a new joint operating concept indicate that considerable change lies in store for the Marines. Whereas the Air-Land battle concept that emerged in the early 1980s emphasized close coordination between ground and air forces, the emerging Air-Sea battle, largely centered on the Asia-Pacific area of operations, emphasizes the joint deployment and application of air and maritime forces across a vast sea-air-centric theater. Emerging threats, such as China’s efforts at developing a long-range anti-ship ballistic missile capability, will be important considerations as the Corps works to come up with its future force structure requirements. The Marines’ drive to rejuvenate their naval heritage might also be inspired by a desire to remain relevant and secure a seat at the table in the emerging Air-Sea battle debate in recognition of a future operating environment that might differ from today’s land-centric conflicts.

So let's take a look at some of the distinguishing features of the emerging strategic consensus of late 2010.

1. A bipartisan movement among defense intellectuals and political figures for strategies of restraint and/or sustainment. Participation in future stability operations looks, at this moment, to be indirect in the mode of John Nagl's Advisor Corps model.
2. Global threats and competitors (Iran and China) that depend more on capable naval and air forces then ground forces.
3. Looming defense budget cuts.
4. A focus on improving long-range strike and unmanned systems.

Keep in mind that these assumptions are just a snapshot of this particular political moment. But they pose some issues for land forces. Given that future COIN is frowned upon by everyone, what is the role of land forces?

Defense intellectuals are examining the possibilities of smaller, but more high-performing units able to operate with greater degrees of independence due to emerging technology. This is somewhat of a historical trend as well, since the division in the first Gulf War operated with the autonomy of a corps, and the brigade combat team resulted from the flattening of land forces into the Modular Force. There is also a corresponding focus on using maneuver and swarming to fight the "low-signature enemy."

Still, the strategic role of ground forces may be a very hotly contested topic in the years to come, especially if the consensus about a shift away from land-centric operations is correct.

One note is that North Korea and Russia do not really figure into the emerging defense consensus. NATO's mission in Europe for a while has been the deterrence of Russia, but this has not been a core mission for a long time. North Korea, however, remains something of a ticking time bomb, although in time the South Korean army has grown by leaps and bounds in its capabilities to counter it.