Building a Strategy for Chaos?

 

A long time ago, Jason Fritz of Ink Spots asked for my input on a post about whether a clear enemy is necessary for the formation of grand strategy. I wrote two drafts of this, which were then eaten up by computer glitches. The funny thing about this question is that despite the gallons of ink that have been devoted to explicit meta-discussions of strategy since formal strategic studies began as a discipline, we still don't have a very clear answer to this very crucial question. This is understandable, since there are some who cast doubt about the existence of "strategy" as a discrete thing that is created by governments or higher headquarters. 

The short answer is that grand strategy isn't something that requires an clear and equal enemy to create. But since grand strategy is something that involves a long time line, a substantially more broad subject area than war strategy, and the utilization of resources in peacetime, it makes more sense to visualize it less as an explicit plan than a collection of practices sustained over a long period of time. The policy of "offshore balancing" which Churchill mentions in this speech is one of those sets of practices. 

Boyd is commonly misunderstood as a tactically obsessed jet pilot whose insights mainly relate to cycling through a decision cycle faster than the opponent. But the importance of his writings to grand strategy is undeniable. His stress on the importance of forming organizations creative and efficient enough to "destroy and create" perceptions of the external environment, increase our own connectivity and degrade that of our opponents, and the importance of establishing a "pattern for vitality and growth" all point to aspects of strategic design that focus less on marshalling resources against a specific opponent than developing a basic strategic template that can remixed for various situations under a process of "plug and play." 

The problem is that as societies grow both more structurally and interactively complex, this process grows much more difficult. That is what The Collapse of Complex Societies is about--how, if we view civilizations as computing mechanisms, how growth makes it more difficult to carry out the basic process of response to changing external conditions that is an essential part of data-processing. Moreover, even in eras of relative simplicity, the ability to aggregate enough information together to form a grand strategic design was exceedingly rare for individuals and more difficult for governments than success stories such as 19th century Prussia might indicate. 

But would having another grand enemy make it simpler? Probably not. The sheer enormity of a global challenge like the Cold War poses difficult questions about long-term strategic competition and the use of resources, and the structure of the competition itself--played out in almost every conceivable venue--was far from purely linear. 

Mark Safranski and I recommended that investment in institutions to better coordinate and develop strategic planning as well as strategic talents would probably be a good short-term structural investment. The Office of Net Assessment and the Integrated Committee on Long-Term Strategy are good examples of these types of institutions. But maybe in the long-term we should start giving burnt offerings and animal sacrifices to the Floating Clausewitz Head. 

Comments

[YN2(SW) H. Lucien Gauthier III]

Floating animal heads is the only thing that pleases the Floating Clausewitz Head... and they are in short supply.

Boyd knew that nuance in each conflict prevented text book answers from ever existing that describe how to win. All you can do is increase your potential avenues for winning, and decrease potential avenues for the enemy (I doubt one can do both in equal measure. There must be some trade off between the two, though not mutually exclusive).

The essence of grand strategy is vision. Really, it doesn't need to be anything more than a vision for the practitioner of grand strategy, given the enormity of the implementation of things on such a macro level. Again, this is what Boyd understood, and so espoused organizations that increase options and allow a greater variety of visions (possibilities). Many people seem to struggle with what Sun Tzu's notion of formlessness is. However, I view it as being poised to take advantage of any one of the possibilities that seem the best for the moment.

Where I think people get caught up in the need of an enemy for a proper strategy, is actually on the operational level. Just as I said above, formlessness is the ability to take advantage of a plethora of possibilities that present them self. However, nothing is truly implemented until that moment of realization, so it does not seem like we even had a strategy till that point (especially in retrospect?).

On a personal level, anything I can consider a success on my part has not occurred because I could spell out each step I had to take beforehand. I don't see why it would be any different on a larger scale. Granted, the person with the vision (strategy) has to be able to articulate what they do know to those who will carry out the vision. Viscount Nelson is remembered because he was able to articulate his vision sufficiently. As is much the case with any great name from military history.

[Shlok]

Quick thought: In business-land, you can't build a business that is based on an enemy. It needs operate independently. Arguably, it needs to affect the environment.

Think Square vs. Paypal instead of what it was - innovate beyond the confines of that dialectic.

[A.E.]

Lucien, I think vision is a large part of it. That's the genius of Fouche's "strategic aggregator" post, because it describes that vision in the sense of what vision is able to achieve.

Shlok, after reading much of the ONA literature as well as the Boston Consulting Group stuff, I'm beginning to think that "competitive strategy" as well as "planned emergence" approaches have a lot to teach the defense community and academia in terms of thinking about strategy.

[Bruno Behrend]

Why does no one apply this stuff to politics, and if they do, who are they?

[A.E.]

Bruno,

The major difference, I think, is the lack of direct applications. There is plenty of what might be considered tactical, operational, and strategic literature specialized to politics--running from everything to the tactics of local competitions to campaign thought to overall thoughts on political strategy. Taking military or grand-strategic thought could give political strategists some insightful metaphors but might also prove to be superfluous and confirm ideas they already hold.

[A.E.]

However, a serious academic effort that explores parallels and disconnects between political strategy and military strategy would be insightful.