Rethinking Security

Operational Theory and Metaphor

In Azar Gat's History of Military Thought, Gat argues that organized military science in the 18th century shifted from descriptions of how to train, equip, and motivate men to the conceptualization and direction of operations. The idea of the "line of operation" originated as a Jominian concept that encompassed the relationship between a base of operations, lines of communication, lines of maneuver, and decisive points in the operation. In turn, Jomini developed these ideas from the more restrictive definition offered by Henry Lloyd, who saw the the line of operation as a line that clarified the relationship solely between marching army and its supply depots.

There's an interesting discussion in the Small Wars Council right now about the evolution of the concept in US doctrine, specifically the growth of "logical lines of operation" (LOOs). LOOs are obviously disengaged from the Line of Operation's physical context, and instead serve as something of a clarifying device for integrating a number of different objectives together (security, information operations, etc).

Chris Paparone (author of a number of different works on operational theory) jumped in to make the most interesting point:

Several years into the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which are characterized more by FID- and COIN-oriented activities and goals, doctrinaires searched for a way to define the metaphysical (“logical”) links between military activities as they relate to more nebulous goals like “population security,” “support to insurgents,” and “increasing legitimacy of the host government.” These writers searched for the additional abstraction to describe how to intertwine activities of other agencies and organizations that are nonmilitary in nature (and may constitute the main effort with the military-in-support). Army doctrinaires called these “lines of effort” while joint doctrinaires labeled them “logical lines of operations.” Keep in mind that these efforts are geared to desirable social and psychological change; hence, are not clearly tied to the physical world. Logical lines of operation are more existential (subjective, interpretive, infused with human-created meaning, etc.) in that they address PEOPLE -- changing minds, social norms, ideas about legitimacy, and so on. In essence, you are orienting military activities and nonmilitary activities on the opinions, values, and attitudes of a POPULATION (be they good guys, bad guys, &/or “fence sitters”).

In essence, as Paparone later argues, the problem with this conceptualization is that it seems to visualize a direct and entirely linear input-output process between an operational-level military or interagency process and a causal effect in a complex social system. The thrust of the emerging Design movement is to use modern social science and complexity theory to try to better orient the span of military activities towards the holistic operational system as well.

The larger problem with Logical Lines of Operation (LOO), though, lies with the disaggregation between the physical meaning and the abstract one. This is something of a problem with modern Western operational theory in general. Many operational theory concepts as conceptualized in the US (such as the debate about the Center of Gravity concept) use abstract and/or metaphorical models to better orient force. The problem, however, is that the abstractness of these models leaves their meaning very fuzzy and in turn problematizes the relationship between the metaphor, the employment of combat power, and the expected output or effect.

The American understanding of the Center of Gravity (COG) concept, for example, sometimes leads to nearly Talmudic parsing over what the COG is, even when the concept (as originally conceptualized by Clausewitz) may not apply to the situation at hand. If several completely plausible (yet radically different) opponent COGs are produced (as they sometimes are in military analyses of opponents) then the American use of the concept should be examined. In turn, the quest for "effects" led Israeli commanders to tell puzzled subordinates to "render the enemy incoherent" in 2006. And to go even far back, we can look at JFC Fuller's concept of striking the "brain" of an army--something that physically did not exist.

The chief risk is that in employing metaphorical concepts as ordering devices for the use of force, one directs force at things that either do not exist (such as JFC Fuller's "brain of the army"). Or, for that matter, there is the risk that the ordering schemas incorrectly manage the translation of force into political power or misdiagnose the relationship between the two entirely. EBO's flaw was that it visualized human societies as closed systems, for example. As I wrote with Crispin Burke back in February, new concepts and debates might clarify this doctrinal controversy a bit, although there are some risks.

COIN: The Book

Like Zenpundit, I was sent a copy of Luke S. Larson's novel Senator's Son , a new novel taking place in the Iraq War. Zenpundit's review has some of the basic background behind the writing of the book and Larson's page has plenty of info on his own interesting story, neither of which I'll rehash here. My review will focus on the strategic themes of the novel--which are stated with an explicitness that is rare for most stories of the type.

Senator's Son is not likely to be found on a COINtra's bookshelf-- it is suffused with the spirit of the counterinsurgency wave of the last ten years. The characters are seen discussing the works of Kilcullen and Galula, and thumb through the now-famous FM 3-24. The characters gain the upper hand because of a shift in strategy to engage the population. Yet the novel does not portray this process as simple nor touchy-feely. There is violence, and lots of it. Resources are always lacking. The trust, cooperation, and reliability of the Iraqis is always contingent. In short, the characters are not living out a Lawrence of Arabia fantasy (or, in the modern day context, Avatar).

While Clausewitz is never referenced, the characters are explicitly aware that they are carrying out "politics by other means." As the great Prussian noted, politics is hardly ever "rational" in the stereotypical understanding nor are its irrationalities always tamed by rational policy, and the characters understand this well. They do not achieve perfect understanding of the situation through ethnographic intelligence , although the understanding they develop is sufficient for their purposes. On a similar note, their friendships with Iraqis, while genuine, are part of an overall alliance of convenience.

If Senator's Son is an argument, its strongest point is that the characters' experiences are part of the larger sweep of history. The soldiers read Victor Krulak's history of the Marine Corps and learn to contextualize their struggle as a chapter in the United States' long-running experience with unconventional warfare. The continuity of this centuries-old history to the present day, although unpleasant, cannot be wished away.

The novel is, like many of the nonfiction books published so far, is a "first draft" of history. In time, other understandings are likely to emerge as the multiplicity of experiences from the conflict (Iraqi and Coalition as well) become part of the public record or become, like Larson's book, part of fiction. But it is a rare and powerful "first draft" because it reminds us that the abstract (and sometimes rather circular) discussions of strategy and policy that tend to dominate the blogosphere are not over some child's game of Risk writ large.

There are real (and devastating) consequences to strategic failure. As much as we can talk about structural factors and incentives and deride a "Great Man" version of history, we cannot deny that war and peace often comes down to decisions made by imperfect men and women in government buildings with far-reaching consequences. Hence the importance of making sure, as does the aged Senator-protagonist throughout the book's many flash forwards--that the right decision is made.

Cartel v. Cartel

John P. Sullivan and me take a look at the evolution of Mexico's narco-war in today's Small Wars Journal. This is the latest of the open-source assessments we began in August 2008.

Gang Research

New piece on global gangs with John P. Sullivan.

Thanks to John Robb, Zenpundit, and Bruce Sterling for helping to get the word out.

Gangs and Conflict Redux

John P. Sullivan and I have a new piece in OpenDemocracy looking at conflict in border zones in the Americas. Key graph:

"While some have fretted that [border] zones could harbor jihadi terrorists, the real danger lies in the violence produced by bloody competition over these lucrative areas and the spread of criminal reach and power throughout the state and across frontiers."

It is, in in essence, an issue of criminal competition and human security rather than national security. In related news, Sullivan was also interviewed by Danger Room on the similarities and differences between counterinsurgency and policing.

Police-Military Interaction in Mexico

My frequent writing partner John P. Sullivan has a great new piece in the Spanish edition of Air Space and Power Journal (link goes to English translation) on police-military interaction in Mexico's drug war.

Key graph:

"Policing post-conflict situations is notoriously difficult for military forces. The military establishes the conditions for order, them generally seeks to transition social control to civil police or transitional gendarmerie forces.50 The situation is even more complex in a state of on-going high intensity criminal violence such as that found in a “criminal insurgency” or drug war. Police and the military are equally challenged by brigands and gangsters who operate with near impunity. This is compounded by the challenge of operating within a fearful community, compromised by corrupt officials and a plethora of security leaks. To effectively operate in this environment, both the police and military services need to develop and employ new skills at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels."

Vigilante Violence Spreads in Mexico

(via Susanne Ure) Unfortunately very predictable:

"As kidnappings, muggings and car jackings spiral out of control, and the authorities appear increasingly impotent, shadowy groups have been advocating justice by the sword. In other recent cases, alleged kidnappers and car thieves have been abducted and murdered and had their corpses dumped in public places along with threatening notes. There are also rising cases of mobs lynching alleged thieves and leaving them beaten, naked and tied up."

Echoes of the Past

The first book on counterinsurgency that I read was David Galula's Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, acknowledged as the primary inspiration behind the celebrated Army/Marine Corps counterinsurgency manual. There have been many criticisms of the "neoclassical" counterinsurgency school, and I think that Frank Hoffman's Parameters article on the subject was most persuasive in delineating some of the theory's limitations.

I have returned to the "classical" era by reading Roger Trinquier's Modern Warfare. Trinquier, like Galula, was a French officer of the late imperial era who cut his small wars teeth in Algeria and Vietnam. I have not gotten far in Trinquier's book, but much of his rhetoric could have been written by defense writers today. Depending on where you sit in the COIN debate that could be either a good or bad thing.

This paragraph, for example, sounds eerily prescient:

"Thanks to a specially adapted organization and to appropriate methods of warfare, they have been successful in imposing themselves upon entire populations and in using them, despite their own desires in the matter, against us. Our enemies are submitting us to a kind of hateful extortion, to which we shall have to accede in the end if we cannot destroy the warfare system that confronts us. We would be gravely remiss in our duty if we should permit ourselves to be thus deluded and to abandon the struggle before final victory. We would be sacrificing defenseless populations to unscrupulous enemies."

"Start Snitching"

Hakim Hazim, who's often written on GroupIntel about gang violence, has an interesting new piece at MSNBC's The Grio on crime and popular attitudes:

"There is a code and practice that has to be addressed in the black community. It's a code of silence that is deafening. It is a code that refuses to hear the blood of our brothers crying out. The "stop snitching" movement is a social construct enforced through various fears including fear of retribution and ostracism. But it's time to move beyond this dishonorable system, once put in place because of racist and hostile law enforcement agencies eager to round up any young black male that they could find."

The "stop snitching" movement is an interesting case for applying counterinsurgency theory to a domestic issue. In many parts of the inner city the police are seen as a kind of occupying army that only enters for raids (Iraq pre-surge?). Functional areas are controlled by gangs running sophisticated operations. "Stop snitching" manifests itself in three levels: a basic blood code enforced with violence by gangs in order to keep the population from offering the police support., a societal attitude (somewhat less significant), and an IO operation produced by those sympathetic to gangs (popular entertainers).
Hazim is right to point to its negative consequences and urge a rejection of the "stop snitching" ethos on a societal level. Yet one of the more basic elements of "stop snitching" is the lack of protection for those who "snitch" in even the smallest fashion. The most basic thing that must be done is to ensure that witnesses who see crimes feel like they can report them without fear of violent retaliation.

Southern Battlespace

New entry on Mexico and South America on RTJ.