Rethinking Security

Southern Battlespace

New entry on Mexico and South America on RTJ.

Countering Terrorists--What It Really Means

Short comment on RTJ on the relevance of the Somalia raid to counterterrorism policy.

Offshore Balancing and the Definition of Victory

Two new posts at RTJ on how to define victory and the limitations of offshore balancing strategies in Afghanistan.

Learning from Mumbai Part 2

Anyone with a subscription to Journal of Information Warfare should check out Chris Flaherty's essay "2D vs. 3D Tactical Supremacy in Urban Operations." Flaherty critiques and expands on the framework John P. Sullivan and I developed in "Postcard from Mumbai" and introduces his own highly original concept of urban defense.

"Divine Justice" in Mexico

Sam Logan and John P. Sullivan have a new article in ISN on La Familia that chronicles the group's emergence and impact on the Mexican security situation:

"Mexican analysts believe that La Familia formed in the 1980s with the stated purpose of bringing order to Michoacan, emphasizing help and protection for the poor. In its initial incarnation, La Familia formed as a group of vigilantes, spurred to power to counter interloping kidnappers and drug dealers, who were their stated enemies. Since then, La Familia has capitalized on its reputation, building its myth, power and reach to transition into a criminal gang itself. While doing so, it has become a powerful regional polydrug organization with its fingers in methamphetamine, marijuana and cocaine trafficking; kidnapping for ransom; and pirated CDs and DVDs - not to mention co-opting politicians and seizing political control and influence."

La Familia is a good example of what happens to ideological groups in drug conflicts. La Familia, like the FARC, is essentially a giant gang now with little linkage to the views it once espoused. That is also why vigilante groups in Mexico are not a sign of the end of cartel terror. Al they signify is another player entering the stage.

Hakim Hazim has a useful post in GroupIntel looking at the impact of micro movements like La Familia with potentially macro impact. This is the reality of strategic compression. And he is right to classify La Familia as a radical grouping, comparing them to Hamas:

"La Familia’s propaganda extends into the realm of faith. One could argue that it is a religious movement as well. The cartel’s spiritual leader, Nazario “The Maddest One” Moreno, has solidified his status as the people’s preacher. He has produced a gospel of self-help for downtrodden supporters, justified violence for its active members, and evangelical zeal and slogans to maintain a sense of familiarity with the larger faith. La Famalia spreads its messages of hope, salvation and divine justice through various media outlets. In addition they have given gifts to the poor and employ a large number of people at ten times the national average (nearly $2000 a month). By providing things the state has not: services, money, religious identity and social mobility within the group, La Familia is winning big political points in the guise of religion. The pattern is not much different from that of Hamas, Hezbollah or many other terror networks that work to secure the favor of the people and have a religious ideology as a cover for their action. Radical networks are evolving and increasing their efforts to win the hearts and minds of the people. The cartels are operating without constraint as a law unto themselves."

Guerrillas Aren't Invincible

Starbuck of Wings over Iraq makes a good point while reviewing an article on why insurgents frequently lose:

"We in the Small Wars Community often take a pessimistic view on counterinsurgencies, focusing on the mistakes that the counterinsurgents make, rather than focusing on exploiting the mistakes of the insurgents. 59% of counterinsurgents are successful, so to steal another Life-of-Bryan-ism, we COINdinistas need to look on the bright side of life."

Like Chet Richards, I have some quibbles with the methodology used in the article's survey of insurgency. However, I think the article does do a valuable service. Sometimes asymmetric warfare theorists can make the enemy seem invincible while giving our forces all of the flaws. Insurgencies face substantial difficulties as well.

The Lagos Raid

Terrorism Monitor has the details on the latest MEND operation in Nigeria:

"Niger Delta militants in speedboats launched a devastating attack on Nigeria’s rapidly decaying energy infrastructure on July 13 by seizing and destroying a major oil distribution point in Lagos, a city of 16 million people. The assault was the first time militants from the Delta region have struck Nigeria’s largest city. ...An assault group from the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) struck the Atlas Cove Jetty during the night, killing a number of sailors guarding the facility before driving away the rest. Dynamite charges were placed on ten pipelines at the terminal and the resulting explosion was heard throughout the city. The attackers returned to base without apparent intervention from the Joint Task Force (JTF), a hybrid security force detailed with eliminating the insurgency in the oil-rich Delta. The attack came only hours before the release of imprisoned MEND leader Henry Okah under a new Nigerian amnesty program."

Jeff Vail has some interesting thoughts about the campaign as a whole:

"MEND fractioned amidst infighting among Ijaw tribal alliances. Various factions, with various political agendas, neutralized the ability to push for peace through negotiations—there was no single party, nor accession to a single set of demands, that could defuse the motivation to violence. In addition, the ransom money that foreign oil companies now routinely paid for the return of western employees spawned a market for guerrilla entrepreneurs—actors who were less motivated by traditional Ijaw political goals than by a return on investment. The lure of easy money has led to a proliferation of militant groups (now perhaps best characterized as criminal gangs) and a dramatic increase in attacks. This infusion of easy money to youthful militants broke down the traditional tribal structure of respect for leadership by elders—much as the infusion of easy drug money makes urban street gangs in the US less accountable to traditional cultural and familial restraints."

The link to street gangs here is rather important, especially given that the attackers struck after Okah was released as part of an amnesty program. The Terrorism Monitor story notes that one faction has named "fugitive militant leader and tribal chief Government Ekpemupolo (a.k.a. Tompolo)" perpetrator of the attack. Some suspect that Tompolo, a warlord with his own elaborate military base, worked a "protection racket" as an security adviser to various foreign oil firms.

The Operational Level for Police

John P. Sullivan and I have a new post at GroupIntel that summarizes some of our more recent work on building a better operational theory for police counterterrorism and high-intensity engagement. In particular, we elaborate on some of the doctrinal and intellectual steps that should be taken to help bring some of the things Fred Leland discusses to pass.

Leland Connects the Dots

One of the more insightful observers of changing law enforcement and counterterrorism practice is Fred Leland, a Lt. in the Walpole, MA police department, Marine Corps veteran, and longtime law enforcement trainer. Leland runs Law Enforcement and Security Consulting, a firm very much inspired by Maj. Don Vandergriff's research and writing on adaptive leadership. Fred has linked to many of the pieces John P. Sullivan and I have written about law enforcement and counterterrorism and incorporated them into his firm's work.

Fred has an interesting piece of his own that I'd like to highlight on creating operational theory for complex law enforcement that expands on our "Postcard from Mumbai" piece on urban siege:

"In my view in police and security situations where conflict and violence often linger, the center of gravity is the adversary’s motives and mindset. Motives and mindset cannot be predicted with certainty; therefore we must develop knowledge of conflict and violence in its three dimensions, the moral, mental and physical and how to translate this knowledge as it is applied in a given set of circumstances. This knowledge combined with the ability to apply in the context of competition or crises based on the unfolding circumstances is ‘operational art.”"

Developing operational art for law enforcement, Leland argues, is going to require extensive knowledge of the dynamics of violence, psychology, and the operating environment and the ability to use that knowledge to guide tactical responses and allocation of resources.

Police Operational Art for a Five-Dimensional Operational Space

John P. Sullivan and I have a new theory article on building police operational theory from the theories of Robert Leonhard, Robert Bunker, and William McRaven. This is the latest in a series of articles we're doing on building operational-level theory for police engagement in counterterrorism and other high-intensity operations. Please check it out at SWJ .